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Introduction: 
Interventions in Digital 
Cultures
Martina Leeker, Tobias Schulze 
and Howard Caygill
Focusing Ambivalences of Interventions in 
Digital Cultures
This volume intends to outline and analyze interventions, under 
the specific conditions of digital cultures, as theory and practice 
of critique; political action (for example protest, demonstration, 
or occupation), and public spheres (politische Öffentlichkeit). 
Interventions are understood as activities that engage in social 
and political contexts, often with artistic means, hoping to inter-
rupt critical situations and ultimately change social, economic, 
or technological conditions. Activist applications of interventions 
eclipse the managerial and military sense of interventions related 
to war, oppression, and control; the focus is on applications that 
represent the positively valued emancipatory efforts of self-
organized, collective, subversive intervention by political, activist 
and artistic communities, among others. 
The premise of this volume is that interventions are influenced 
and shaped by the conditions and epistemologies of digital 
12 cultures, even when not directly technological. Exploring the 
possibilities of participating and intervening in digital cultures 
requires a prior analysis of the cultures themselves, for such 
interventions happen within zones of infrastructures that are not 
fully visible, understandable, or controllable. The task is no less 
than to intervene in the socio-technological and techno-political 
conditions of existence that lie beyond our consciousness and 
appear to be out of our hands. As technological environments 
and concepts are understood as ubiquitous, we cannot escape 
them, so interventions always have to reckon with them. In order 
to intervene effectively in such environments and conceptual 
structures we must be able to analyze them and, if necessary, 
adapt to them. This predicament of being shaped and shaping 
becomes constitutive for intervention. It is against this back-
ground that the book asks how interventions are shaped by 
the conditions of digital cultures, and how they can contribute 
reflexively to altering and reshaping these conditions. 
Engaging with these questions and situations, the book adopts 
a twofold approach. The first involves studying interventions 
and focuses on the reciprocal shaping and reshaping of digital 
cultures and interventions. A deeper understanding of the con-
stitution of interventions in digital cultures is required, because 
it may be that not every aesthetic of interventions is able to 
interrupt digitality. Could interventions unwillingly repeat the 
constitutive conditions that they intend to intervene in? This 
problematic situation leads to the second approach, which 
follows the conditions of interventions in digital cultures and 
explores, furthermore, their proper constitution, concerning, 
for example, their genealogy (Fred Turner’s contribution), their 
involvement in the history and constitution of the political 
(Howard Caygill’s contribution), their entanglement with the 
sometimes ideological constitution of technology (Wendy Hui 
Kyong Chun’s contribution), gender aspects (Kat Jungnickel and 
Ulrike Bergermann’s contributions), and the politics of space 
(Ulrike Bergermann’s contribution).
13With these contributions, the volume aims to intervene 
reflexively and critically in the field of interventions through a 
close reading of their conditions, genealogies, constitutions, 
and entanglements, and hence their hidden political sense and 
regime.
Challenges of Interventions Under the  
Conditions of Digital Cultures 
It is remarkable that interventions have been in vogue (Hart-
mann, Lemke, and Nitsche 2012) since the 2000s as “the” form 
of critique, political action, and public spheres (politische 
Öffentlichkeit) in digital cultures. In 2012, Friedrich von Borries, 
professor and curator of design at the Academy of Art in 
Hamburg, published a glossary of interventions subtitled: 
“Approximations towards a too-much-used, but too-little-defined 
notion” (von Borries et al. 2012).1 Borries maintains that: “Inter-
ventions are the miracle cure of our times. Quickly in, intervening, 
quickly out. Great effect—little effort. In war, in the arts, in urban 
development, in therapy”2. This estimation also holds for the 
aesthetics of contemporary interventions with artistic means 
or in activist contexts, which focus on performative approaches 
(Klein [2012] 2013). They tend to make intervening an end in 
itself, establishing acting as a recursive system. Interventions 
are always ready for the next action; they are self-referential, 
performing for a potential future and coming up with not a new 
order but the next intervention, pointing to a further inter-
vention. The question is whether and how this hype is related to 
digital cultures.
1 German title: Glossar der Interventionen: Annäherung an einen 
überverwendeten, aber unterbestimmten Begriff.
2 “Interventionen sind das Wundermittel unserer Zeit. Schnell rein, eingreifen, 
schnell raus. Große Wirkung mit wenig Aufwand. Im Krieg, in der Kunst, in 
der Stadtentwicklung, im therapeutischen Bereich” (von Borries 2012, verso). 
English translation by the authors.
14 It is striking that in a situation where digital cultures become 
performative (Leeker, Schipper, and Beyes 2016) and unleash 
automation and self-organizing infrastructures, interventions are 
really hyping performative manners of acting and protest (Klein 
2017). While technological devices become agents themselves, 
generating reality and engaging with human agents in affective 
(Angerer 2015) techno-social ensembles (Sprenger and Engemann 
2015), interventions invented themselves as a performative 
force, and engage in social change just by performing. While 
globally networked infrastructures fall into a continuous and 
self-reliant processing of data, intervention emerges as the 
engendering, even the installing, of a regime of endless processes 
of intervening.
This logic opens a comparison to what Orit Halpern (2017) as well 
as Halpern and Robert Mitchell (2017) call the “smart mandate” of 
infrastructures in digital cultures. This mandate points to a fur-
ther aspect according to the actual insights of research on digital 
cultures. It is not just about a regime of infrastructures that are 
invisible to human agents and operate beyond human conscious-
ness, collecting and processing data for profiling and predicting 
future activities. Nor is it purely about subjects being constituted 
and controlled, as Antoinette Rouvroy (2013) explains, by “data-
behavior” and an “algorithmic governmentality.” It is particularly 
to do with a culture of distributed, worldwide, smart infra-
structures that comes up with an epistemology of uncertainty 
and resilience. Resilience is constituted by the idea and practice 
that reality is too complex to be controlled or predicted and that 
the self-organized infrastructures should be capable of resisting 
and surviving political or ecological attacks by virtue of their own 
capacities and organization. In this epistemology of resilience, 
socio-technological existence becomes, according to Halpern and 
Mitchell, a permanent demonstration or test for the adaptation 
of the next unpredictable event. This demo-regime announces 
the end of the socio-political task of problem solving. There are 
no problems, only affordances for the optimization of resilient 
15adaptation. This regime of smartness corresponds interestingly 
with the hype of performative interventions mentioned above. 
Both deny solutions and instead perform interventions—the pure 
and continuous testing and experimenting of resilience. 
The epistemological similarity between the hyped performative 
aesthetics of interventions and the infrastructural environment 
reminds us that the constitution of interventions takes place 
according to the technological conditions of digital cultures. They 
are then not just intervening in, but perpetuating, digital cultures, 
supporting them and generating a kind of digital impotence via 
interventions. People become hyper-occupied with intervening 
the moment they are asked to perform as data providers in 
accordance with the technological and economic needs and inter-
ests of digital cultures. Intervening with performative aesthetics 
means feeding, unwillingly, the whole-earth-data-network with 
performances of itself. In this ambivalent situation, we need to 
investigate whether the interventions that constitute our capacity 
to reflect and act, and even our ability to resist, are not inex-
tricably entangled in the conditions that we want to intervene in. 
Intervening and the Constitution of 
Interventions
A critical and reflexive use of interventions must be envisaged 
to avoid the unwilling repetition of those regimes of digital 
cultures. This book proposes a twofold method to establish such 
usage—combining analysis of digital cultures and the role of 
interventions in them with systematic exploration of the con-
stitution of interventions. It could be realized by reconstructing 
genealogies of interventions or by rethinking the concepts and 
discourses of interventions—an integral element of the con-
tributions to this volume. Another option would be to carefully 
revise intervention methods by comparing them with the techno-
epistemological impacts of digital cultures. 
16 What is revealed is that interventions with artistic means can 
be part of a politic of forced democratization, as in the Cold War 
(Fred Turner’s contribution), as well as an instrument of resist-
ance in war and revolution (Howard Caygill’s contribution). 
Following the twofold analysis can inform us about intervention 
methods, showing that pure interruption has become senseless 
in digital cultures, as it is part of digital recursion. Suddenly, it 
is the establishment of sustainable, alternative structures and 
technologies (Alexander R. Galloway and Wendy Hui Kyong 
Chun’s contributions) that becomes the perfect and adequate 
intervention. 
Interventions should be accepted and taken seriously in their 
ambivalence and doubleness. Interventions are highly relative, 
driven by theories and discourses on their constitution. Inter-
ventions may therefore look completely different according to 
the theoretical insights in which they are couched. Interventions 
are not a priori “good” in the sense of emancipatory potentials 
and effects. Their constitution means that interventions can be 
included in regulation and control, and they can be engaged for 
social change, making themselves obsolete, as Steve Kurtz points 
out in his interview, once the structures and dominance relation-
ships that are the target of interventions have been dismantled.
Outline of the Book 
To undertake the explorations needed, this volume brings 
together scholars from philosophy, political theory, media 
studies, and sociology/ethnology as well as practitioners of 
interventions. Their texts unfold to reveal an assemblage of 
diverse intervention methods. Beyond the perspectives of single 
disciplines or specific aesthetic approaches to interventions, 
methods can be seen as the common ground of the different 
contributions. Each considers a specific aspect of intervention 
in digital cultures and develops from it a critical and practical 
engagement. It is hoped that this interplay of methods and their 
17theoretical foundation will support a productive thinking, which 
is inspired by the ambivalences of interventions, and lend the 
volume relevance as a critical and practical guide for future 
interventions.
Acknowledgements
This volume originated from the symposium Technological Con-
ditions of Interventions: History, Epistemology, Dramaturgy, held in 
May 2015 at the Digital Cultures Research Lab (DCRL) of Leuphana 
University.3 We are very thankful to the symposium partici-
pants (Ulrike Bergermann, David Berry, Howard Caygill, Hervé 
Fischer, Bernard Dionysius Geoghegan, Kat Jungnickel, Marcell 
Mars, Alexandre Monnin, Imanuel Schipper, Fred Turner, and 
Nina Wakeford) for their valuable and inspiring talks and vivid 
discussions, as well as, of course, for the individual contributors’ 
essays for this volume that arose from the symposium. The book 
also contains interviews with scholars who play an important 
role in the research and practice of interventions: they enrich 
the volume enormously, referring to the conditions of inter-
ventions in digital cultures, and we are thus very grateful to the 
interviewees we were able to lure into participating.
This book itself wouldn’t be as it is if it weren’t for the helpful 
and professional aides and assistants. A big thank you goes out 
to Inga Luchs for her work on typesetting and formatting the 
manuscript, to Janet Leyton-Grant for her patient and accurate 
proofreading, and to Sara Morais for the transcription of inter-
view material. Moreover, we want to express our gratitude to the 
editorial board for cooperative and important critical reviews. 
Finally, we are indebted to and want to thank Ina Dubberke, 
Samantha Gupta, Irina Kaldrack, and Armin Beverungen for 
their support and paramount organizing talent, for both the 
symposium and the publication; their commitment, and that of 
3 For documentation of symposium contributions, see Leeker 2015. 
18 our DCRL colleagues, affords us the opportunity for truly trans-
disciplinary scholarship, discussions, and academic exchange.
References
Angerer, Marie-Luise. 2015. Desire After Affect. London/New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield. 
Halpern, Orit. 2017. “Hopeful Resilience, Efflux, Architectures.” Accessed 
May 10, 2017. http://www.e-flux.com/architecture/accumulation/96421/
hopeful-resilience/.
Halpern, Orit, and Robert Mitchell. 2017 (forthcoming). “The Smartness Mandate: 
Notes Toward a Critique.” In Grey Room. Accessed March 29, 2017.  
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53c7f8cce4b0e4db83a38f5b/t/58752be7
20099e802621da15/1484073960267/smartnessmandate+Halpern.pdf.
Hartmann, Doreen, Inga Lemke, and Jessica Nitsche, eds. 2012. Interventionen: 
Grenzüberschreitungen in Ästhetik, Politik und Ökonomie. Munich: Fink.
Klein, Gabriele. (2012) 2013. “Choreografien des Alltags: Bewegung und Tanz im 
Kontext Kultureller Bildung.” Kulturelle Bildung Online. Accessed March 29, 2017.  
https://www.kubi-online.de/artikel/choreografien-des-alltags-bewegung-tanz- 
kontext-kultureller-bildung.
Klein, Gabriele. 2017. “Urban Choreographies: Artistic Intervention and the Politics 
of Urban Space.” In The Oxford Handbook of Dance and Politics, edited by Rebekah 
Kowal, Randy Martin, and Gerald Siegmund, 131–148. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Leeker, Martina. 2015. “Technological Conditions of Interventions: History, Epis-
temology, Dramaturgy.” Experiments&Interventions. Accessed March 29, 2017.  
http://projects.digital-cultures.net/dcrl-experiments-interventions/
politische-oekonomie/interventions/.
Leeker, Martina, Imanuel Schipper, and Timon Beyes, eds. 2016. Performing the 
Digital: Performativity and Performance Studies in Digital Cultures. Bielefeld: 
transcript.
Rouvroy, Antoinette. 2013. “The End(s) of Critique: Data-Behaviourism vs. Due-
Process.” In Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn: Philosophers of Law 
Meet Philosophers of Technology, edited by Mireille Hildebrandt and Katja de Vries, 
143–168. Abingdon: Routledge.
Sprenger, Florian and Christoph Engemann, eds. 2015. Internet der Dinge: Über 
smarte Objekte, intelligente Umgebungen und die technische Durchdringung der 
Welt. Bielefeld: transcript. 
von Borries, Friedrich, Christian Hiller, Daniel Kerber, Friederike Wegner, and 
Anna-Lena Wenzel. 2012. Glossar der Interventionen: Annäherung an einen 
überverwendeten, aber unterbestimmten Begriff (IMD). Berlin: Merve.

		DEMOCRACY	 	
		DEMOCRATIC	PERSONALITY	 	
  FASCISM  
  MULTIMEDIA  
  SURROUND  
		DEMOCRACY	 	
  FASCISM  
[ 1 ]
Surrounds,	Be-Ins,	and	 
Performative Participation: 
Shady Sides of Art and 
Interventions
An Interview with Fred Turner 
by Martina Leeker
Beginning	in	the	1940s,	a	group	of	former	
Bauhaus designers, American artists, and 
American intellectuals sought to intervene in 
cultural and political transformations. To revisit 
that history is to see how art and political 
power can become entwined, even when artists 
have the most democratic of intentions. In the 
1940s,	Americans	built	multimedia	environ-
ments—democratic surrounds—which they 
hoped would help generate liberal dem-
ocratic personalities by training audiences 
to curate their own aesthetic experiences. 
In	the	1960s,	these	environments	gave	rise	
to	an	artistically	grounded	psychedelic	Be-In	
and to a new holistic participation in a world 
of electronic media. In both cases, however, 
designers,	scientists,	artists, and	politicians	
hoped that media would become both a means 
of	liberation and	a	mode	of	control.	This	history	
leaves	us	with	the	question	of which	aesthetics	
and	art	forms	could	support	a	more	demo-
cratic mode of engagement today. By working 
through the history of interventions and the 
arts, this conversation aims to reveal lures and 
traps that should be avoided in contemporary 
interventions.
Martina Leeker: Nowadays, we see hype around artistic inter-
ventions as well as about art as intervention, both being 
considered practices to generate and develop a public 
sphere and the self-determined capacity to act. But we 
learn from the research in your books, From Counterculture 
to Cyberculture (Turner 2006) and The Democratic Surround 
(Turner 2013a), that art is not a priori “good,” in the sense 
that it is not per se democratizing, bringing more capacity 
to act, to resist, or to change conditions for people. Thus, 
before doing interventions with artistic means or art as inter-
vention, it is important to do a historical checkup concerning 
the politics of interventionist artwork since the 1940s. 
Fred Turner: The books together trace a history of the inter-
section of art, counterculture, and technology from about 
1940 in the US to when the Internet goes public, which is 
about 1993. It ’s about a 50-year arc. What you see in that 
period is a constant back and forth between the art world 
and the technology world. They’re not separate; there is a 
very similar class of people working in both spaces and there 
23are a whole series of spaces where they intersect with each 
other. 
 During World War II, artists began to develop multi-image 
environments and a really rich environmental sensibility. 
It went on to have a big impact on how we thought about 
computing later. But in the 1940s it was pre-digital. It was a 
way of trying to make a really democratic medium. At the 
time, many Americans believed that one-to-many media 
such as film, cinema, newspapers, and radio reflected a 
top-down, authoritarian mind-set. A certain set of artists 
and propagandists wanted to build a surround. They wanted 
every individual to be surrounded by images or sounds so 
they could be free to choose what they wanted from that 
environment. That idea migrated into the technical world 
through Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson (Turner 
2013a), who were involved in both wartime propaganda 
efforts and were central participants in the Macy Con-
ferences1 that brought us cybernetics. By the late 1940s, 
when Norbert Wiener was working on cybernetics, he was 
thinking both technically and with models of environmental 
communication that actually come from Bauhaus refugees 
to American propaganda, and from there, through Mead and 
Bateson, to cybernetics. 
 And that’s just the first of many kinds of intersection points. 
Later, during the 1960s, Billy Klüver’s2 group, Experiments 
in Art and Technology (E.A.T.), brought engineers from 
the Bell Telephone Laboratories (Bell Labs) together with 
painters and performance artists in New York. Even before 
1 The interdisciplinary Macy Conferences were held from 1941 to 1960 in New 
York, within the cybernetic conferences from 1946 to 1953. (Pias 2003)
2 Billy Klüver was an engineer at Bell Labs. He founded Experiments in Art and 
Technology with artist Robert Rauschenberg in 1967. Klüver started to col-
laborate with artists such as Jean Tinguely at the beginning of the 1960s. His 
aim for engaging in the collaboration of engineers and artists was to make 
technology more human. 
24 that, people like the architect, systems theorist, designer, 
and inventor Buckminster Fuller were bridges between the 
worlds. Buckminster Fuller patented the geodesic dome 
in 1952 and sold it to the American military to house radar 
for the Defense Early Warning Line, the DEW-line. It then 
became the preferred housing of back-to-the-land commune 
builders in the 1960s and early 1970s. So, it ’s a kind of back 
and forth between the arts and technology. And I think that’s 
what we’re seeing in many art worlds today. 
ML: What is the socio-cultural, the political and the epis-
temological impact of this back and forth of art and 
technology, even military, and what are the kind of problems 
it brings for combining art and interventions? 
FT: In the late 1930s and early 1940s, American sociologists, 
social thinkers, psychologists, anthropologists, and political 
leaders were all students of what was called at the time 
“culture and personality anthropology.” They believed that 
every culture had a kind of dominant, modal personality and 
that families trained children to match that personality. So, 
people thought, for example, that Germans had a kind of 
authoritarian personality style and that somehow Hitler had 
latched on to that. People also believed that media, meaning 
movies, radio and the like, were like extensions of the 
family. After you grew up and left home, media did the work 
of continuing to form your subjectivity in ways that were 
appropriate to your culture. Thus, they believed that German 
media would need to be more authoritarian, while American 
media were meant to be more democratic. 
 And this was partly how Americans explained to themselves 
the mystery of Adolf Hitler. Until the late 1930s, Americans 
really believed that Germany represented the pinnacle of 
European culture. When Hitler became chancellor in Ger-
many, Americans were just mystified. How had the most 
cultured nation in Europe turned to this guy for leadership? 
25One of the most popular answers was that somehow Hitler 
had mastered the mass media. He had somehow built a 
kind of mediated system for taking Germans away from 
their rational cultured selves and just melting them into an 
authoritarian mass. 
 As World War II got under way, American leaders thought to 
themselves, “Okay, look, we need to have morale, like the 
Germans have. We need to be as strong as the Germans. 
But we can’t make our citizens into authoritarians.” So, there 
was a big debate in the Roosevelt administration. One side 
said, “Joseph Goebbels, he’s doing great. We should do what 
he does and if our citizens become authoritarians, too bad. 
We’ll fix that later.” It ’s terrifying, but that was a real dis-
cussion. And then there was another side, and it was led by 
a group called the Committee for National Morale, which 
Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson were part of. This side 
said, “Now look, we need to find a democratic kind of morale, 
and we need to build a media form that will sustain it.” They 
theorized democratic morale using a mix of democracy 
theory and personality theory. A democratic person, they 
said, was someone who could choose their own experience, 
who had a uniquely integrated set of experiences, who could 
embrace others who were very different than themselves, 
across racial lines, across lines of sexual preference, across 
national lines—in other words, a cultured, cosmopolitan 
liberal. That person had to be made. And they believed that 
the best way to make them with media was to surround them 
with images or sounds from which people could choose 
the elements that were most meaningful to them. As they 
chose those things, they would be practicing the styles of 
perception on which the democratic personality depended. 
 The members of the Committee for National Morale 
didn’t actually make media. But in 1942, at the Museum of 
Modern Art (MoMA) in New York, their ideas became the 
basis of a propaganda exhibition called “Road to Victory.” 
26 It was designed by Herbert Bayer, a Bauhaus figure who 
had recently immigrated to the United States, together 
with Edward Steichen, the photographer who would go on 
to create, from 1951 till its opening of 1955, what almost 
certainly remains the most widely seen photography 
exhibition of all time: “The Family of Man.” “Road to Victory” 
was an image environment with pictures of America hung 
over people’s heads, down by their feet, at every level. 
People were meant to walk through it together, yet have 
unique, individualized experiences, to choose what they 
wanted to see and to see it in their own way. They were 
meant to be individuals together—that’s the liberal ideal, 
that’s the American ideal in that period, that’s the dem-
ocratic mode of morale. Bayer and Steichen hoped that 
by creating these surrounds, they would give people the 
“freedom” to define themselves as individuals and as cit-
izens, simultaneously. 
 Now of course from our own time we can see that these 
surrounds are surrounds—people have choices, but the 
choices have been set for them ahead of time. They can 
only choose among the images that are there. They can only 
choose among the perceptions that are available to them in 
a setting that’s been curated. I would argue that that’s a lot 
like our media environment today. We have lots and lots of 
choices but all of them carefully curated. 
ML: This means that we can’t thoughtlessly take the aesthetic 
dispositive of surrounding people with multi-optional media 
environments as a method of intervention today because it 
is based on a problematic understanding of democracy. It 
is about a kind of elitist curating; some people know what is 
good for mankind better than others. So, we have to make do 
with an ambivalent aesthetic-political endeavor because on 
the one hand it trains decision making and individuality and 
on the other, it is based on regulation and control. But I’m 
surprised that you mentioned the exhibition “Family of Man” 
27by Steichen in this context. Was it really democratizing con-
sidering, for example, what many critics have said were the 
heteronormative and racist implications of the exhibition?
FT: The generation of art critics from the 1980s have made the 
case against “The Family of Man” very powerfully. They have 
called it racist, sexist, and nationalistic, even neo-colonial. 
But if you go back and study the actual responses to the 
show in that period and look closely at the images, you’ll 
find something quite different. Abigail Solomon-Godeau 
(2004), for instance, is a very famous art critic and she said 
that there are no pictures of black people and white people 
holding hands together. That is not actually true (see Turner 
2012). She said that there were more denigrating depictions 
of African-Americans than white folks. Again, not true. I went 
through and counted them. Pictures of Africans are there; 
they were taken by African photographers. “The Family of 
Man” presents a much more egalitarian world than most 
critics think today. Yes, it has the kind of family ethos that we 
found to be a problem in the 1980s and 1990s, but in its own 
time it was seen as very radical. 
 Let me give you an example. Near the center of the 
exhibition, there was a now-famous image of a polygamous 
African family in rural Africa living in a couple of huts. To 
the critics of the 1980s, it looked like a denigrating image. 
It primitivized Africans and it privileged heteronormativity, 
they believed. Critical voices say: “Look, there are no queer 
people in this show, there are just straight people, they’re 
having families.” Okay. If you go back and read the response 
to the show, people who saw the show were amazed. For 
them, the polygamous family image actually opened up the 
possibility of different ways to organize sexuality, ways of 
being different than they were. Steichen asked his audiences 
to identify with polygamists. He asked white Americans to 
identify with Africans and African-Americans. This is 1955, 
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the Cold War and a deeply racist time in America. 
 Another example: in the center of the show, there were four 
very large images, each maybe 10 feet tall. One of these 
images has Japanese people in traditional costumes, another 
has Italians, another has Russians, and another has impover-
ished white Americans. I cannot tell you how difficult it was, 
10 years after World War II, for Americans to look at a large 
picture of traditionally dressed Japanese people over their 
heads and to be asked to identify with them. You know, my 
grandmother was still so angry about World War II and what 
the Japanese did that in 1988 when I bought a Toyota, she 
didn’t talk to me for two weeks. 
 So, I think that if you go back and look at the material of the 
time, “The Family of Man” is actually a much more open show 
than the critics of the 1980s and 1990s have suggested. It 
looks closed to us now, but at the time it opened the doors to 
lots of different ways of being—prominently including anti-
racist and antisexist modes. 
ML: But it was this multi-perspective and multi-media environ-
ment that had this doubtful notion of democracy you speak 
about. This must be seen as a problem?
FT: I think that in the early 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, the multi-
image environment, the multi-sound environment that I 
call the democratic surround, were forces for good. They 
were designed to produce democratic subjects and they 
were closely associated with a series of egalitarian political 
movements that we’ve forgotten. We’ve forgotten that 
in the wake of World War II there was a radical push for 
homosexual rights, very publicly. In 1941, a number of 
American intellectuals pushed very hard against American 
racism. They said look, if we’re going to go to war against 
Germany and German racists, we have to fix our own 
race problems at home. We’ve forgotten those things. We 
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of increasing repression, of containment, psychological, 
political, racial, all of it. That’s just not accurate. Or at the 
very least, it ’s not the whole story. It was a much more con-
flicted and open time. What actually happened—and it’s even 
sadder—is that as the 1950s went on, the surround form lost 
its original political associations. After World War II, the form 
traveled to two places: it went to the art world and it went to 
propaganda exhibitions in Europe. These exhibitions were 
designed to promote American politics but also American 
commerce, and they appeared around the world. As they did, 
their original political ambitions melted away. The surround 
became an architecture not for a new politics, not for a new 
egalitarian social system, but for consumer choice. The anti-
racist and the pro-sexual diversity critiques of the 1940s and 
early 1950s simply melted away. 
 You see this most dramatically in the 1959 American National 
Exhibition in Moscow. The exhibition was a showcase for 
the surround mode of display. The designers and architects 
Charles and Ray Eames offered a seven-screen multi-image 
slide show called “Glimpses of the USA,” and “The Family of 
Man” was shown there, alongside huge displays of American 
consumer goods—everything from books and records to 
washing machines. Those who built the American National 
Exhibition hoped that audiences would conflate consumer 
choice with political choice and so conclude that democracy 
would improve their lives. 
 A similar process took place in the art world. The hap-
penings of the late 1950s and early 1960s borrowed heavily 
from the aesthetics of the democratic surround. Yet they 
left the expressive politics of the 1940s off the stage. When I 
looked at archival pictures of happenings, I was completely 
surprised. I thought they would be radically open, radically 
diverse. On the contrary: with very few exceptions I saw 
young, white men dominating environments in which there 
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often naked underneath wet sheets or layers of whipped 
cream. They had clearly been made to be watched as objects 
of sexual desire. I can remember seeing no more than 
one or two people of color in a hundred images. The hap-
penings were heteronormative, white, male environments. 
But they’ve been celebrated as environments of theatrical 
choice. Spectators got to choose what they paid attention 
to; they were surrounded by the imagery. What actually 
happened—it’s so sad—is that the politics associated with 
the surround form in the mid-century, in the 1940s, dis-
appeared across the 1950s. It became a kind of consumerist 
politics by the early 1960s, in propaganda exhibitions and art 
alike. 
 This had a real impact on psychedelic art in the 1960s. The 
art started to become deracinated, depoliticized. It became 
about personal experience. It became about consciousness. 
Young, almost exclusively white, almost exclusively middle-
class Americans now began to offer up psychedelic media, 
LSD, and countercultural technologies as tools with which to 
achieve a new consciousness. But they did it in environments 
that were racially segregated. The communes of the 1960s 
were almost exclusively white; they were often dropped in 
the middle of areas where there were Mexican Americans or 
Native Americans who were ignored and pushed away. They 
ended up replicating the kind of contained American society 
that the 1960s ostensibly pushed against. So that’s where 
the breakdown happened: in the 15 years after World War II 
ended.
ML: We have two similar problems for art as intervention. In the 
1960s, a depoliticization of the artistic “democratic surround” 
took place, whereas in the 1940s/1950s we see a political 
and economic instrumentalization of artwork going for the 
“surround.” Concerning the political instrumentalization, I 
also think of the exhibitions of the abstract expressionists 
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Foundation, which was connected to the CIA (Saunders 2000). 
These were supposed to show the world: this is American 
art, this is against Hitler fascism and socialist realism. So, art 
figured as a kind of weapon in the Cold War. 
FT: And that happened to the surround form as well. I found a 
document in the United States Information Agency archives 
and it shocked me. It was a declassified document from the 
early 1950s that explained how to use media abroad. We 
needed to act like psychotherapists, it argued. We needed to 
assess the psychological condition of the foreign people—
were they democratic or not?—and we needed to stage a 
media intervention. Then, we needed to measure and see 
if our intervention was effective. Starting in 1956 during 
the International Trade Fair in Kabul, Afghanistan (Turner 
2013b),3 and for a decade thereafter, this is what we did: 
we built these multi-image environments in places where 
we thought people might not be democratic, and then we 
tested people as they left the building to see if they’d actually 
been changed. It started in Afghanistan (Turner 2013b)4 
and by the time it reached Moscow in the 1959 American 
National Exhibition, it was a very sophisticated process. 
We had notebooks; we had translators who kept track of 
3 “The high-tech dome, the cutaway plastic farm animals, even the arrays 
of multi-sized photographs—all were built to channel Afghan desires for 
modernization in a Western direction. The environment was designed to 
offer visitors a range of choices as to where to place their attention, from a 
set of objects that had already been selected by invisible experts.” (Turner 
2013b) 
4 “Collated by researchers and delivered to their American managers, Afghan 
responses to the exhibition could shape the design of future exhibitions, 
and perhaps even that of American policy toward Afghanistan and other 
nations…. In this way, visitors became elements in an extended feedback 
loop. By measuring audience responses to the exhibition, American officials 
could feed them back into the next round of exhibition design. Each iteration 
of the cycle would in turn, in theory at least, intensify the psychological 
impact of the next exhibition.” (Turner 2013b)
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that recorded the questions that people asked as they 
moved through the exhibition. It ’s astonishing. This kind 
of surveillance I think foreshadowed our world. We live in 
a world in which we are invited to have experiences all the 
time, but we are very carefully monitored. You know, living 
in America these days can feel a little like living in a super-
market with spies. 
ML: So, we had artistic interventions by means of multi-media 
environments for a regime of capitalist-democratic beings 
in the 1940s and 1950s. This demonstrates that we have 
to consult the history of artistic interventions and their 
entanglement with politics and economy if we want to make 
interventions in digital cultures. Studying their genealogy 
should prevent the same mistakes from being made. Is there 
something in the concept and practices of multiple per-
spectives that we could keep as a democratizing method?
FT: I think we can keep the structure. The multi-image structure, I 
would argue, was extremely political in the 1940s and 1950s. 
It ’s powerfully political. “The Family of Man,” you know, 
had about 800,000 visitors in the first months that it was 
open. It ’s been seen by millions of people over the years. 
Heck, its catalog has sold nine million copies, it ’s still up in 
Luxembourg, still on display. I’m not sure, but I don’t think it 
has ever not been on display somewhere—since 1955. So that 
show had an impact. 
 I think the question to ask ourselves now is, with what 
institutions are we partnering, and what happens when we 
partner with those institutions? Also: what are we asking 
our viewers and our audiences to do or see? Are we con-
fronting them with things that make them uncomfortable? 
Are we asking them to identify with things that matter? One 
of the legacies of the people I’ve studied that bothers me 
is that when they did “The Family of Man” and these other 
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kind of one-to-one identification with a person in an image. 
The individual was very much the center of the action there. 
That is the nature of liberalism. But I would ask: what kind 
of media can we make now that let us find a third place 
between commercial or state institutions and sort of collab-
orative liberalism? Is there something in between in there? 
And that I don’t know, but that’s what I’d be looking for. I 
think the form itself is more flexible than we give it credit for 
being. I think a lot of it is how we deploy it.
ML: Let’s follow up with the kind of interventions artists did in 
the 1960s. We see the movement “Art and Technology” as the 
non-profit organization Experiments in Art and Technology 
(E.A.T.) you mentioned in the beginning, or the hippie artist 
group around Gerd Stern, the Company of Us (USCO) (Turner 
2013a). They had been intermingled with Marshall McLuhan’s 
research in media (McLuhan 1964) as well as with industry 
and technology, especially with systems engineering. And 
they shared an interest in LSD (McLuhan 1969). Their aim 
was to change people’s consciousness and make them more 
open to the world, integrating them into their technological 
environment. What should we learn for today’s interventions 
from this environmentalization of perception and cognition, 
this kind of becoming dazzled, going with drugs, opening 
one’s mind, and all this done by the artists, trying to offer 
LSD-like experiences to their recipients with artistic means 
in order to help them adapt to the new electronic world? 
Do we come from an epistemology of multi-perspectives in 
the 1940s and 1950s to one of being dazzled, drugged, and 
opened in the 1960s?
FT: Openness is a word that was very meaningful in the 1950s and 
1960s, but also very deceptive. When we think back about 
McLuhan, when we think about acid and we think about 
the 1960s, we’re looking at a time when people became 
what Buckminster Fuller called “comprehensive designers.” 
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resources around us, pull them out of their industrial con-
text, and use them to transform our minds and thereby our 
societies. LSD was one of those industrial resources. 
 The second thing that we have to see is that artists, like many 
American citizens in that period, were utterly fascinated by 
technology. So, when they took LSD they were doing two 
things: one, they were in some sense opening themselves to 
a new consciousness; and two, they were also just literally 
doing what the American military and industrial complex was 
already doing. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the military 
had built computer systems to scan the far side of the globe, 
to see as far as they could. The military understood the 
whole globe as a system that could be monitored. Well, you 
know, in 1966, after the three-day Trips Festival in Long-
shoreman’s Hall in San Francisco, Stewart Brand, a famous 
1960s figure and founder of the Whole Earth Catalog, sat on 
top of a roof in San Francisco and wondered why he couldn’t 
see over the curve of the world. He hoped that LSD might 
help him do it. You know, that kind of thing is very powerful. 
It ’s a sort of weird imitation of military-industrial power. 
 The third factor, which is again something we forget now, was 
that electronic media in the domestic space were incredibly 
new. Television was only about 20 years old in the late 1960s. 
It totally changed things. Everyone used to have a big radio 
in the living room. The whole family could sit around and 
listen, that was one thing. But when you got a little record 
player and you could take it into your room and dance alone, 
that was a different thing. That was a big deal. And when you 
could get an automobile or a car and drive and be free that 
way, that was also a big deal. 
 So, I think one thing that McLuhan was doing was marrying 
the kind of system-oriented sensibility of elite military 
industrial thinkers to the new experience of consumer 
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Americans, but especially hippies, who bought into Fuller’s 
idea of comprehensive design, tried to use those new 
technologies as ways to gain the kind of insight, vision, pres-
tige, and legitimacy that the military industrial experts had 
in that period. Now, this doesn’t speak very well for many 
artists at the time. And that’s a problem. And I don’t know 
how to think about it. I admire a number of the artists from 
the time a great deal, especially USCO, but at the same time 
I can see them at least playing with fires that were lit in 
the military. And playing with technologies that had other 
purposes. It looks to me like they are playing at being the 
kinds of people who are on the edge of destroying the world. 
ML: The episteme of a resonant “Be-In” became crucial within 
the artists’ interventions of the 1960s. It meant that we are 
an integral part of the technological environment. Where 
did this Be-In come from, and do we inherit traces of it in 
today’s performative technological environments, with 
miraculous and mysterious self-organized technical things 
and infrastructures?
FT: I think all those things owe their origins to cybernetics. And 
I know that Gerd Stern of USCO first learned of cybernetics 
through a draft of Marshall McLuhan’s book “Understanding 
Media,” which he got at a party from John Cage. So, I know 
these folks were reading it. And you know the key cybernetic 
insight, in Norbert Wiener’s version of cybernetics at least, 
is that the world is a constantly communicating system of 
information. Things are just patterns of information that 
happened to have acquired solidity, and you yourself are just 
a pattern of information that has acquired solidity for some 
period of time. The essential cybernetic insight is that the 
entire world is communication. It ’s just literally information. 
When we move our bodies in the world, Norbert Wiener 
describes them as information systems seeking feedback. 
We are like little machines. We bump into the chair, we bump 
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me—I should go in another direction. In the 1960s, the idea 
that human beings were both communication systems in 
their own right and elements in a global system of infor-
mation scaled right up. It became an almost mystical notion 
that everything was interconnected. Everything was one. As 
USCO used to put it, “We Are All One.” It ’s a technology-ena-
bled vision of being in constant intercommunication. And of 
course, that’s also the vision behind the Internet, behind the 
World Wide Web and a lot of Silicon Valley today.
ML: If we are still in, the question may be: how to come out again? 
FT: Yeah, how to come out is a great question. I think we have to 
be careful too, in a contemporary sense, not to think that 
the “Be-In” (being in) is the political statement that people 
in the 1960s thought it was. You know, in the 1960s there 
were really two countercultures. One was focused on doing 
politics to change politics, and we can call that the New Left. 
And the other was a sort of technology-enabled conscious-
ness movement, mostly concentrated in a series of com-
munes in the late 1960s. The Be-In is mostly in that second 
group. It ’s the tool or the technique that grows out of USCO’s 
1966 show at the Riverside Museum in New York (Turner 
2006, Turner 2013a). Within the logic of the Be-In, we have 
only to put ourselves in the right environment. We can then 
understand ourselves as collaborative citizens, as parts of 
a system, and we can then begin to act in right ways. That’s 
tremendously naïve. There’s a desperate urge to just avoid 
politics completely. And when you avoid politics like that, you 
take up technology and consciousness, sure, but you also 
take up consumerism. You take things, you buy things, you 
eat things, you wear styles. And this is another place that the 
politics of the 1940s left us when they faded away. You just 
can’t solve the problems besetting America by dropping acid 
and seeing patterns.
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ation. In the 1960s, systems engineering was the important 
technology, which made an environmentalization of media, 
and the artists’ Be-In could be seen as an answer to this 
shift to self-organized and self-referential techno-social 
systems. Today we see the transformation of systems into 
the infrastructure of ubiquitous computing, pervasiveness, 
and invisibility, in which everything is fine, like here in Silicon 
Valley. I would like to pursue the question of the heritage of 
the 1960s Be-In. 
FT: We imagine ourselves as free in that world and we imagine 
our interactions with that system as completely individuated. 
When I pick up my iPhone, I think, “Oh, it ’s just me and my 
phone. I’ll call somebody I like and I’ll make a connection and 
that will be good.” No! Apple’s watching, other companies are 
watching. Even as I make a private phone call, my data are 
traveling who knows where. I am constantly engaging with 
institutions and I don’t know who they are. That’s not okay. 
 I think to understand what’s going on now, we have to go 
back to the 1950s and 1960s and to the rise of a kind of 
managerial figure. This is a figure who appeared in industry 
and also in the arts. It was the person who designed the 
system and managed the system. When we talk about artists 
making systems art, what they were doing was things like the 
Pepsi Pavilion, done by E.A.T. for the World’s Fair “Expo ‘70” 
in 1970 in Osaka (Turner 2014). They were designing environ-
ments in which people could experience their place in the 
system, just as the 1960s counterculture said they should, 
but also where the artist could be a computer-based man-
ager of people’s experiences. They were factory managers; 
they were bosses in a new kind of factory. And we happen to 
have a new kind of factory now. And the terms of that factory 
were set back there, in that mix of management discourse 
and artistic discourse. And that is something that we have to 
hold against artists of the period. I think we have to say, you 
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legitimizing of a new mode of control, the mode of control we 
inhabit now. 
 Okay, so, that’s the negative. The positive is, you know, 
Silicon Valley is not Berlin in 1939. There is a lot of power 
here, but it really is quite flexible. It ’s quite elitist, it ’s mod-
erately racist, certainly sexist, in the technology world 
anyways, and these things are all true and they are all 
problems, and I don’t see people building environmental 
technologies today of a kind that will help liberate us in the 
way that so many Americans tried to in the 1940s. But at the 
same time, I don’t feel dominated directly in the way that I 
might have in a more fascist era. I do feel dominated though. 
And this is that thing, this is that mode of management 
that the surround form pioneers. I am free, but I am free in 
terms that are constantly being negotiated and set for me 
invisibly by managers, who work for states and companies. 
And my devices, my digital technologies, enlist me. They 
automatically make me a citizen in countries that I never 
voted to join. 
ML: This managerial figure as a contradictory constellation of 
management, control and a free individual reminds me of 
the concept of a self that we might inherit from the 1960s. 
David Tudor invented, for example, an ambivalent concept 
of control and the loss of control as model for a self in the 
performance series “9 Evenings. Theatre and Engineering,” 
organized by Billy Klüver and Robert Rauschenberg. In his 
piece “Bandoneon! (a combine)” he enabled a self-com-
position of the sound system, which he finally controlled 
by a switch device, interrupting all the sounds if he wanted 
to. Or Yvonne Rainer’s piece at “9 Evenings”: in “Carriage 
Discreteness” she instructed the performer via walkie-talkie 
to transport things on the stage in order to generate the 
impression of a freely self-organized system. 
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What did the president of the United States want to do in 
the late 1950s? He wanted to open up and set free the com-
munist peoples of Europe; the captive peoples of Europe. I 
would argue that what David Tudor is doing in that sense is 
something like what John Cage was doing in his music and 
what Eisenhower was doing in politics. In the space of artistic 
intervention, in the space focused on the subjectivity of the 
listeners and the audience, the artists and engineers of “9 
Evenings” are attempting to liberate sound in a way that is 
entirely parallel to America trying to liberate the minds of 
former European enemies in that same period. I think it ’s the 
same cultural logic at play. 
ML: There is another aspect of Yvonne Rainer’s performance, and 
that’s paranoia. It was evoked because there seemed to be 
some invisible control in the well-organized choreography. 
Maybe paranoia becomes a form of governance, which is 
perhaps important for us today because we know we are 
being watched. We know it, but we are interacting never-
theless within our technological environments. 
FT: So, in this context, it ’s worth revisiting Americans’ Cold War 
fears of hypnosis. Think about the movie The Manchurian 
Candidate, done by John Frankenheimer in 1962. During the 
Korean War, many Americans believed that the Koreans 
would capture our soldiers, brainwash them and then send 
them back to be weapons here. And now we hear about 
ISIS and other groups sending their brainwashed citizens 
here to attack us, and yeah, paranoia is one thing. But I’m 
really struck by how “9 Evenings” and performances like it, 
perhaps the Pepsi Pavilion too, seemed to offer spectators 
the chance to imagine themselves as active participants in a 
world of science and technology that was really much bigger 
than they were. And in the 1970 World’s Fair in Osaka, I’d say 
three-quarters of the exhibitions were immersive environ-
ments. You see them over and over again offering a way to 
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control. 
ML: I would like to come back to my question: how to get out of it? 
FT: Well, in a lot of ways, Facebook is a structured world for per-
manent and perpetual happenings. Everyone participates. 
You are surrounded by images. You pick your crowd, and 
you get to hang there. It happens. I’m happy to report that 
infrastructures like these are still incomplete. And that’s 
really important. I am pained when I go to a bar and there 
are televisions all around me. I am pained when I go to a 
café and everyone is typing on their computer or everyone 
has their cell phone out. I am really pained when I see young 
people who should be looking into each other’s eyes looking 
down into their cell phone screens instead. That’s just heart-
breaking. So, okay. But you can still put it down, you can still 
walk out into the world. 
 You asked me earlier how we might resist this encir-
clement. Artists and engineers often want to take up tools 
and build something, either to stop what’s going on or to 
bring something new into the world. I think we need to do 
something much more boring. I think we need to make 
stronger political institutions. The state and its powers 
of regulation are really important. You know, here in the 
United States and Silicon Valley, I see the kinds of inequalities 
that the tech world brings about. I see what Uber does to 
its drivers; I’m thrilled that Germany is resisting that. I’m 
thrilled to see the Germans, French and English bring their 
regulatory regimes and their civic consciousness to bear and 
push back on these companies. Because these companies 
are rapacious and they will expand just as fast as they can. 
I think that one of the best things you can do is slow them 
down. Just slow them down and think about them. Watch 
them for a while and think about them, see what happens. In 
the States, and particularly in California and Silicon Valley, I 
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taken for granted in Germany. We just don’t have that here. 
We have a deep and rampant individualism. Yes, that might 
be effective for innovation, but that’s arguable. I would say 
the Germans are just as innovative in their industries. It ’s not 
good for imagining civic alternatives. For civic alternatives 
you need a state, you need a civitas—something civic. 
 My question for artists who want to intervene would be: 
How do you make a kind of art that draws us to a new civic 
consciousness, that celebrates the institutions that promote 
a sustained civic consciousness, and particularly that help 
you work with people that are different from yourself? That 
was the original ambition of the Committee of National 
Morale in the 1940s. It was to build environments that let 
you sympathize with, empathize with, and collaborate with 
people of different races, sexual preferences, ideas, and 
origins. Where are those environments now? I don’t need 
another technology to connect with my friends. I see my 
friends anyways. Where are the worlds that will help me con-
nect with the ones who are very different than me? Where 
are the worlds that will sit me down with a refugee at a coffee 
table and let me talk? 
ML: What about art as intervention today? We see for example 
so-called environmental art engaging in the development 
of a consciousness for a relational being in the world as a 
fight against the effects of the Anthropocene. Do you see any 
traces of the history we discussed here in this movement? 
FT: One of my fears with relational art or with practice-based 
performance is that it still echoes so much of what was done 
in the 1960s—after the politics that were attached to media 
environments in the 1940s had faded away. There’s a lot 
of art right now where you enter an environment and you 
participate in some way and that participation is meant to 
be sort of political, but you’re acting out some version of the 
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help. I don’t want to see agitprop. I don’t want to see the kind 
of bad theater they had in the 1930s in the United States. But 
I do want to see art that sparks critical reflection. Not art 
that asks me to act out and even savor my own subjection to 
power structures that are bigger than me.
ML: Do you have any good examples for your preference?
FT: I think I would start with non-performative art, as a general 
rule. I think there is some beautiful photography right 
now. I think holding still is a good tactic. The power of the 
still-framed image is only growing in a time where images 
are moving all the time, circulating rapidly while we too 
are physically moving. In that context, something that 
demands we hold still and look is very powerful. There’s 
a photographer named Wayne Lawrence, who published 
a beautiful book called Orchard Beach: The Bronx Riviera in 
2013. Orchard Beach is an area in the Bronx, where very poor 
people go to the beach. And he just does beautiful, very 
formal portraits of these people in their bathing suits with 
their families. You have to see the people in them. You can’t 
not see them. That’s powerful—to see people who may not 
be like you. If you want to make the world a better place, 
that’s what I would go for. 
 Another model of intervention would be a feminist model 
from the 1960s. I very much admire the visual artist Carolee 
Schneemann. And her performance “Meat Joy” in 1964 is a 
good example of taking the environmental sensibility that 
had been depoliticized and repoliticizing it. She rolled around 
on the ground with men and women, most nearly naked, 
in meat with blood all over themselves, at the peak of the 
Vietnam War. This was a time when feminism hadn’t really 
been born yet—at least, second-wave American feminism. 
That’s powerful. She gave you something to meditate on that 
was not a repetition or reclamation of the dominant style. 
43And I would compare that to some of the environments 
that we see today that are installed in museums. These new 
environments are highly technical. They surround us and 
ask us to integrate ourselves into technical social systems. 
These new installations are much more like invitations to 
psychotherapeutic adjustment and obedience than what 
Carolee Schneemann was doing. So, I guess, what I want to 
say is that performance itself is not necessarily a problem. 
But we need to find modes of performance that don’t repeat 
the modes of power that we are already stuck inside.
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Strategic Intervention  
and the Digital Capacity  
to Resist
Howard Caygill
What is the character of strategic intervention 
in contexts where there is a claim not only 
to a monopoly of the use of the means of 
violence but also a monopoly of secrecy? What 
options for resistance are available when the 
state extends its claim from the monopoly of 
violence to a monopoly of information? What 
is the quality and the conduct of resistance—
its strategic options—when confronting not 
only the potential physical violence of state 
and corporate power but also its arcanum, the 
realm of secrecy and the exclusive control of 
access to information that it inhabits? Such 
questions immediately address the case of 
digital resistance, whether in the use of the 
Internet as a means for coordinating resistance 
or in resistant interventions carried out on the 
terrain	of	the	Internet.	They	assume	specific	
urgency when it is understood that the Internet 
is increasingly assuming the character of an 
arcanum, or place where states and corporations 
pursue a monopoly of secrecy, which is to say, 
the goal of denying us our secrecy. What is a 
strategic intervention in a context where the 
state’s claim to monopolize secrecy or access to 
information necessarily entails the surrender of 
any such claim on the part of civil society? 
Arcana and the Internet
For some, the classic example of a strategic intervention in an 
arcanum is the Second World War. Once the arcanum of German 
and Japanese control and command—the Enigma coding of 
military communications—had been compromised by the work of 
Alan Turing and other cryptographers at Bletchley Park (Erskine 
and Smith 2011), what were the strategic options available 
for effective intervention? The obvious option was to use the 
information gained by the breach of military secrecy to secure 
short-term military advantage: if you know where the U-boats 
are you warn the ships in the convoys; if you know where enemy 
forces are and their intentions, you intervene in a pre-emptive 
response. But such intelligence-directed interventions would 
immediately alert the enemy that you had broken their codes—
entered their arcanum—and they would respond by reconfiguring 
their codes. Another strategy consists of the selective and even 
disguised use of the information, intervening under the cover 
of fictions (spies sent and sacrificed, spies invented, bodies 
floating in the sea bearing false secrets), all designed to prevent 
47the enemy from suspecting that their monopoly of secrecy had 
been compromised and their codes broken. In this case, strategic 
intervention becomes a play on appearances—giving any other 
explanation for operational knowledge than the real one. But 
this also entailed massive sacrifice—deliberately losing battles, 
only intervening when the secret of knowing the enemy’s secrets 
is not risked. Neal Stephenson’s novel Cryptonomicon—pub-
lished in 1999 and widely read within the hacker community—
fictionally elaborates on the scenario that the Second World War 
didn’t happen but was a fiction, a cryptonomicon or fictional 
intervention in the arcanum. However extravagant the fiction, 
it remains the case that the field of operations research in the 
1940s was close to the arcanum and many of its personnel—John 
von Neumann, Turing—would be crucial in the pre-history of the 
Internet.
Why Assange Missed the Point
In his 2012 dialogs Freedom and the Future of the Internet, Julian 
Assange referred to the “militarization of the Internet,” or the 
“tank in your bedroom,” “the soldier under the bed.” For him “the 
Internet, which was supposed to be a civilian space, has become 
a militarized space … [and as] the communications at the inner 
core of our lives now move over to the Internet … our private lives 
have entered into a militarized zone.” “We can’t see the tanks,” 
he concludes, “but they are there” (Assange et al. 2012, 33). This 
view contributes to his skepticism concerning the emancipatory 
potential of the Internet, his view that the possibilities for resist-
ance that it offers are narrow and precarious. Referring to Egypt, 
but we could now add Turkey, Hong Kong and the United States 
itself, he warns that digital resistance is a high-risk gamble that 
once ventured, has to prevail “because if it doesn’t win then that 
same infrastructure that allows a fast consensus to develop will 
be used to track down and marginalize all the people who were 
involved in seeding the consensus”—the “critical participants.” 
But how to win in this arcanum where the odds are not in favor 
48 of resistance: What would it mean to intervene strategically? 
Assange’s almost intuitive response is to expose and protect—to 
expose the arcanum, state, and corporate secrecy at the same 
time as protecting his own and his whistleblowers’ secrecy by 
intense cryptography. 
Assange’s skepticism is a salutary warning to any attempt to 
mount a digital resistance, but it is important to reflect further 
on its central premise regarding the “militarization of the Inter-
net” and its implications for an understanding of the limits and 
possibilities of resistance. My reflections will return obsessively 
to Carl von Clausewitz and his posthumously published On War 
of 1832 (von Clausewitz 1832–1834); Clausewitz is a central figure 
both for the development of the Internet and for assessing its 
potential for resistance. Is Assange right when he says that the 
Internet “was supposed to be a civilian space” but is becoming 
militarized? Is it not well known that it was always militarized and 
that its civilian uses were an accidental exception—space wrested 
from the military, or conceded by it…? It is, but without really 
appreciating the gravity and implications of such knowledge for 
the capacity to resist, prime among which is that if we move in a 
space that is a militarized arcanum, then our actions have to be 
guided by the appropriate rules and precautions: strategy.
Clausewitz’s War of Resistance
Clausewitz is central to the elaboration of a modern theory of 
resistance. In spite of its title—On War—his posthumously pub-
lished masterpiece is less about war—Krieg—than resistance, 
Widerstand, or more precisely the war of resistance. On War is not 
so much an analysis of war than an account of how to resist the 
emergent military strategy of the revolutionary nation state—
France—through what the Peninsular War had called the “little 
war” or guerrilla, as opposed to the grand guerre conducted by 
the revolutionary armies. From the outset, Clausewitz offers a 
conceptual refinement that still in many ways eludes current 
49strategic discussion around the theory of resistance; he is inter-
ested above all in the capacity or ability to risk resistance—Wider-
standsfähigkeit—and not just its performative eruptions. Already 
on the first page of his first chapter, he defines the two objectives 
of war as: compromising to the point of destroying the enemy’s 
capacity to resist while enhancing your own. As an idiosyncratic 
Kantian, his categorical imperative might be phrased, “act so that 
maxim of your actions enhances your own and compromises your 
enemy’s capacity to resist.” The rules for ensuring the survival 
and enhancement of this capacity are what constitute strategy 
for Clausewitz—it underlies his specific and historical discussion 
of the disposition of forces and of tactics. It is basically temporal 
in that it involves the survival or enhancement of the capacity 
over time—and in pursuit of the strategic aim of enhancement 
permits tactical retreat and evasive action. Furthermore, 
Clausewitz’s account acknowledges the centrality of information 
(and misinformation) for preserving or enhancing the capacity to 
resist, and in particular the maintenance of secrecy. It was this 
view that earned him the admiration of Marx, Engels, Nietzsche, 
Lenin, Mao, Guevara and most recently perhaps his closest and 
most successful exponent, Nelson Mandela.
But Clausewitz was not only read by the left, his work was also 
central to nuclear strategy in the Cold War, on both sides, but 
especially in the emergence of strategic discussion during the 
1950s in the United States. There were two opposed positions. 
On the one hand, nuclear deterrence originally formulated by 
the mathematician John von Neumann and pursued by Pres-
ident Eisenhower, and on the other, a neo-Clausewitzian position 
emphasizing survival and the enhancement of the capacity 
to resist. The latter position was associated with the RAND 
Corporation and its most prominent exponent was Hermann 
Kahn, who detailed its execution in an influential theoretical 
text On Thermonuclear War published in 1960. Kahn argued in 
internal RAND Corporation papers and publically in his book that 
the prime strategic objective should be less the avoidance of 
50 nuclear war than the enhancement of the possibility of survival 
and the continued existence of a capacity to resist or, in terms of 
operations theory, the means of ensuring continuous command 
and control. His underlying premise was that strategists should 
prepare the option of launching nuclear war with the security that 
the capacity to resist would survive a first or retaliatory strike.
Kahn’s Resistance after Nuclear War and the 
Invention of the Internet
Kahn’s bringing Clausewitz’s On War into the nuclear age as On 
Thermonuclear War gives an invaluable glimpse into the quality 
and range of discussions in the RAND Corporation during the 
1950s. He focused on the strategic options available under a 
“post-attack” scenario, advocating in the name of the RAND 
Corporation a series of pre-emptive measures to ensure the sur-
vival of the capacity to resist after a nuclear attack. He lays out a 
program of strategic planning dedicated to ensuring the survival 
of the United States but most importantly of its capacity to resist 
in a post-attack environment:
Our study of non-military defence indicated that there are 
many circumstances in which feasible cultivation of military 
and non-military measures might make the difference 
between our facing casualties in the 2–20 million range 
rather than in a 50–100 million range (Kahn 1960a, 98). 
The non-military measures include what will later be known as 
“civil defense”—fall-out shelters etc.—while the military measures 
focus obsessively on assuring the survival of the “command and 
control” structure vital to order, sanction, and execute a counter-
attack. A pre-emptive strike on the part of the USSR is assumed 
to be directed against “command and control arrangements” 
in order to disable any possible counter-attack. Kahn predicts 
that “the bulk of their blow will be directed towards destroying, 
crippling or degrading the operation of our retaliatory forces” 
51(Kahn 1960a, 165–166) and in particular the system of command 
and control. He returns repeatedly to this vulnerability, which 
he describes as the “Achilles’ heel” of current strategic doctrine, 
advising that “we should become more conscious of the central 
role that command and control is likely to play in the future as a 
possible Achilles’ heel of otherwise invulnerable systems” (Kahn 
1960a, 301–302). The latter vulnerability was regarded as critical 
for the survival of the capacity to resist under nuclear attack and 
received increasing attention not only from Kahn but also from 
other researchers within the RAND Corporation.
Kahn’s strategic planning focused on putting into place reliable 
systems of command and control that were guaranteed to 
survive and continue functioning after a nuclear first strike. The 
planning entailed putting in place “some kind of information 
gathering network of data-processing centers that can receive 
and evaluate information, make decisions and transmit orders, 
all in a matter of minutes and even seconds. It seems feasible 
to build systems that will do this even when under enemy 
attack” (Kahn 1960a, 187–188). The substitution of “feasible” for 
“desirable” is characteristic of Kahn and the RAND Corporation’s 
can-do ethos—if it was necessary to invent such a network, then 
it had to be “feasible.” The only limitation Kahn seemed to place 
on the network was that it be analog, adding that “Nobody is yet 
willing to trust the decision of war or peace to a computer” (Kahn 
1960a, 188). However, this was precisely part of the pragmatic 
response of a key technical researcher in the RAND Corporation 
to Kahn’s strategic call for a system of command and control able 
to continue functioning after a nuclear first strike.
Kahn and the RAND Corporation’s strategic requirements for 
ensuring the survival of the United States’ capacity to resist 
contributed to the thinking that helped lead to the invention of 
the Internet. This is well-known, and a common response to the 
view of the military, Clausewitzian origins of the Internet is to 
present it as an interesting coincidence with few implications for 
future developments. However, such a genealogy is important 
52 for formulating strategic postures for resistance involving the 
Internet given that its origins were themselves part of a resist-
ance strategy. The contributions of the RAND Corporation 
researcher Paul Baran are especially important in this respect. 
His work was dedicated to supplying the network capable of 
technically delivering Kahn’s strategic demand for a survivable 
system of command and control. In a paper from 1960 prepared 
for the United States Air Force—On a Distributed Command and 
Control System Configuration (Baran 1960b)—Baran cites Kahn’s 
1960 RAND Corporation paper The Nature and Feasibility of War 
and Deterrence (Kahn 1960b) as motivation for his invention of a 
survivable command and control network.
Baran and Information War
Baran sought a control and command structure—or capacity 
to resist—that could survive a nuclear first strike. The option 
of bomb-proofing physical cables was explored but consid-
ered prohibitively expensive and unreliable. Baran focused 
instead on the idea of decentralized networks—first linking AM 
radio stations bearing only two messages—initiate and cease 
attack—then the telephone network, moving finally to theorize 
a distributed communication network with built-in redundancy 
and the ability to transmit discrete message packets. Baran later 
reflected: 
If the strategic weapons command and control systems could 
be more survivable, then the country’s retaliatory capability 
could better allow it to withstand an attack and still function; 
a more stable position. But this was not a wholly feasible 
concept because long-distance communication networks at 
the time were extremely vulnerable and not able to survive 
attack. That was the issue. Here a most dangerous situation 
was created by a lack of a survivable communication system. 
That, in brief, was my interest in the challenge of building 
survivable networks. (Baran cited in Naughton 2000, 96) 
53In a series of RAND Corporation papers ranging from Reliable 
Digital Communications Systems Using Unreliable Network Repeater 
Nodes (Baran 1960a) in 1960 to On Distributed Communications 
(Baran 1964) in 1964, Baran proposed a distributed, decentralized 
network as the structure of communications most resistant to 
enemy attack. He also proposed that it be used to transmit bursts 
of digital information (later called “packets”) that could arrive by 
any number of routes across the network to be re-assembled at 
the receiving station. This would ensure that the network would 
be neither fatally compromised nor overloaded in the event of 
an attack. Both the network structure and the digital modality 
served to enhance the system’s capacity to resist. 
While it is widely accepted that Baran’s work indirectly provided 
the intellectual inspiration for the Internet, it is also held that its 
implications pointed beyond the military matrix in which it was 
conceived. It was an example of research of considerable civil 
import funded by the military but openly published and subject 
to scientific debate and public applications that far exceeded 
its contribution to defense (see Warnke 2011). However, as with 
everything published by the RAND Corporation, even the fact 
of publication was of strategic significance—and Baran’s papers 
were no exception. The RAND Corporation was happy with the 
USSR knowing that the USA had theorized and was moving to 
implement a survivable control and command system. Indeed, 
the adversary’s knowledge of the possibility and existence 
of such a system was essential to its working as effective 
deterrence. Even so, it might be argued, the implications of 
the research into distributed and thus decentralized networks 
eventually exceeded even this strategic context, providing the 
conditions for an emancipatory use or resistance of the non-
hierarchical network.
54 Internet as Control
This view became a powerful ideological argument for an 
antihierarchical, even libertarian, view of the net that saw in 
its decentralized architecture an unanticipated possibility for 
non-hierarchical exchanges of information. Unfortunately, this 
view neglects other forms of control over the distribution of 
information that were also designed into the distributed net-
work. We now know that debates within the RAND Corporation 
concerning distributed networks were accompanied by research 
into cryptography and the concealment of message paths and 
contents in a system with the potential to archive and make avail-
able to surveillance all of its communications. Baran’s distributed 
network was also a cryptonomicon since a distributed network 
had an even greater need for cryptography, building secrecy and 
the control it afforded into its very architecture. This interest 
and the research it generated were secret and withheld from 
the published papers, which were consequently in no respect 
the unintended “free gift” from the military to a future non-
hierarchical and democratic Internet.
The RAND Corporation’s proposal foundered in the face of 
opposition from the telephone companies; however, Baran’s 
papers were noted in the UK in the National Physical Laboratory 
(Donald Davies and packet-switched networks) and brought 
to the attention of another US strategic body—the Defence 
Advanced Research Projects Agency—known as ARPA (dropping 
the D). The detail of the history is complicated, but the same 
problem of a survivable network, decentralized but with com-
pensating cryptography to ensure concealed control, persisted in 
the networks that evolved towards the Internet. In spite of their 
apparently non-hierarchical architecture, the history of these 
networks and their theoretical inspirations points to the con-
struction of the Internet as an arcanum or space of secrecy. 
55How to Resist the Internet
This brief account of the concealed role secrecy played in 
the early formulations of the Internet puts into question any 
imprudent use of the Internet as part of a resistant strategy. It 
would not be an exaggeration to regard the Internet as one of 
the most prominent contemporary theaters for the struggle of 
contemporary resistance movements to invent, maintain, and 
enhance a radical capacity to resist. The struggle is conducted 
on two main fronts: the first is resistance to the state’s claim to a 
monopoly of information and strategy and the second, resist-
ance to state infiltration and surveillance of social networks and 
the capacity to resist they have helped bring into existence. The 
first front is the struggle for and against secrecy—the attempt 
to sustain powerful encryption on the web against the will of 
the state and also the effort to compromise state and corporate 
encryption. This struggle has a history dating back to the 1990s, 
in which Wikileaks, the Edward Snowden US National Security 
Agency (NSA) exposures, and Anonymous are but the most recent 
skirmishes. At stake is the state’s claim to monopolize the infor-
mation transmitted on the web and to archive its movements and 
content at its openly illegal pleasure. Ironically, Chelsea (Bradley) 
Manning and Snowden’s whistleblowing was made possible by a 
relaxation of the rules of access to the arcanum that was part of 
the strategic response to 9/11 and the view that the USA’s capacity 
to resist had been compromised by excessive secrecy and the 
reluctance of the intelligence agencies to share information. The 
redistribution of the arcana of state secrecy, which was thought 
strategically necessary to secure the capacity to resist a new kind 
of enemy, paradoxically undermined it by extending access and 
making its secrets vulnerable to public exposure. 
The other side of the coin of exposing the arcana of state is 
maintaining oppositional or civil secrecy through encryption. This 
is a difficult and fallible project, but one which is pursued with 
great strategic clarity and a keen sense of the paradox involved 
56 in protecting civil society (Öffentlichkeit) through secrecy. This 
is an old problem, going back to the publication of Immanuel 
Kant’s essay “Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment” 
(Kant 1784) in the pages of the journal of a secret society—the 
Berlinische Monatsschrift. The strategic stakes involved, however, 
should not be underestimated, since such efforts on the part 
of civil society constitute a challenge to the emergent claim to a 
monopoly of secrecy on the part of the state. 
The ability to compromise the state’s capacity to resist by 
weakening its monopoly of secrecy and hence its strategy is 
an important complement to the ability to use social media in 
constituting an oppositional capacity to resist on the part of civil 
society. The two campaigns are usually understood separately, 
but compromising the state’s ability to survey civil society’s use 
of the Internet is essential for the latter’s ability to resist the 
state. For this is one of the simultaneous strengths and weak-
nesses of using social media to foster strategic discussion and to 
organize resistance. They can certainly deliver unprecedented 
levels of articulated and disciplined mass action, but also every 
step in constituting the capacity to resist and mounting resist-
ance—as in the Istanbul Taksim Republic for example—can 
be traced and policed if the resistance is not successful. The 
very arts that permitted the creation of a capacity to resist on 
the eve of resistance can also undo it on the day after. Mega-
data can be used to trace associations (routine work for the 
NSA and other intelligence agencies) and to reconstitute with 
extreme precision the oppositional capacity to resist and its key 
members—militants and theoreticians—and even to proceed to 
their physical elimination (see Chamayou 2015). From one point of 
view, the web can liberate resistance and create a new capacity to 
resist, but from another it can also serve as the instrument for its 
decisive repression.
57New Capacities to Resist 
Rosa Luxemburg’s dictum that resistant struggle itself gives rise 
to new capacities and constituencies of opposition was vindicated 
by the resistant actions in Hong Kong. Haunted by the memory 
of the failure of the Tiananmen Square occupation in 1989, which 
compromised the Chinese population’s capacity to resist for 
over a quarter of a century, demonstrators associated with the 
two main strands of the Hong Kong resistance—Occupy Central 
with Peace and Love and the student Scholarism movement—
adopted a strategy that they hoped would ensure the survival 
of the capacity to resist in the prospect of what Mao himself 
described in the 1930s as a “protracted war of resistance.” Along-
side the restraint and commitment to non-violence shown by the 
resistants—by now classical resistance tactics learned from Gan-
dhi and the US civil rights movement—were a number of effective 
tactical innovations. The most striking was the conscious effort 
to limit the use of social media for strategic and tactical discus-
sion in order to avoid leaving a record of the constitution of a 
capacity to resist that would help the authorities to unravel and 
compromise it at a later date. The demonstrators made wide use 
of the app FireChat, which makes an off-grid social network pos-
sible using Bluetooth and Wi-Fi—ideal for mass gatherings. Over 
100,000 copies of the app were downloaded in a day, putting the 
app to a use that doesn’t seem to have been anticipated by its 
designers (they say on their website, perhaps with faux naïveté, 
“Whether you are on the beach or in the subway, at a big game 
or a trade show, camping in the wild, or even travelling abroad, 
simply fire up the app with a friend or two and find out who else 
is there”). The strategic benefit is nevertheless clear: one of the 
devices connected to FireChat can serve as a portal to the web 
and to exposed on-grid global social media; this device could 
employ deep encryption, and the decrypted messages then dis-
seminated through FireChat in a way that left few traces for the 
state to follow later. This was an example of strategic prudence 
characteristic of both previous and contemporary resistant 
58 politics; it complemented and further mobilized the resistant 
virtues of a non-negotiable passion for justice and courage. It tes-
tified not only to the need for resistance and protest, but also to 
prudence in the choice of means through which they are pursued, 
above all through what Clausewitz identified as the prime 
objective of a resistant politics—the creation and preservation 
not just of an act of resistance but more importantly of the 
capacity to resist.
Yet I should end with some comments on the desirability of 
a resistant intervention that frontally challenges the state’s 
claimed monopolies of violence and secrecy. It brings with it 
a number of problems that might make us wary of adopting 
it too enthusiastically as a political philosophy or technique. 
First of all, the emphasis on strategy and enmity in the theory 
of resistance brings resistant politics too close to the model of 
warfare—perhaps politics and political reason are and should 
be distinct from strategy? In this case, the ever closer relation-
ship between state monopolies of violence and secrecy might 
provoke disproportionately violent responses to any threat 
posed to its monopoly of secrecy and an escalation of conflict 
that can only compromise the capacity to resist. Furthermore, 
perhaps a resistant politics, however ingenious and imaginative 
its tactical innovations, is ultimately reactive, reacting against 
initiatives of its adversaries—as was the case in Hong Kong—and 
not initiating and guiding political change. Perhaps, too, resist-
ance is too somber a politics, whose emphasis on the cardinal 
virtues of courage, prudence, and justice limits the emancipatory 
élan that is characteristic of revolutionary politics to questions 
of survival under conditions of repression and open attack. And 
finally, perhaps resistance is less a political philosophy than a 
politico-military technique, one that can be adopted in the name 
of emancipation but also in the name of reaction and repres-
sion. This leads to the final concern or question—if the arcanum 
is indeed an important site of current interventions and requires 
an appropriately encrypted resistant strategy, what implications 
59will this have for the existence of a public sphere and even 
democracy? 
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Intervening Infrastructures: 
Ad Hoc Networking and 
Liberated Computer 
Language
An Interview with Alexander R. Galloway 
by Martina Leeker
Following	a	first	wave	of	interventions	that	
employed the style hackers have used since the 
1960s—intervening	in	networks	by	mirroring	
their technology—a second wave is now 
engaged in questioning the needs and use of 
networks,	claiming	to	re-think	them	through	a	
perspective of withdrawal. One option for other 
kinds of networks may be “ad hoc networking,” 
altering the structures, politics, and economics 
of commercial platforms as well as the pure 
functionality of algorithms. Instead of doing 
unpaid work, which we all do as users of the 
Internet,	thoughtless	about	our	data-behavior,	
a space of imagination and invention should be 
opened to enable creative possibilities.
62 Martina Leeker: In doing interventions in digital cultures we are 
confronted with infrastructures, like the Internet, which are 
ruled by algorithms. To intervene in such infrastructures, 
should we dispose of our knowledge of technology and its 
history so that we don’t support the politics and regimes of 
data and control, but to come to forms of resistance? What 
relevance does your theory of the ambivalent existence of 
networked infrastructures between their statuses as closed, 
controllable and open, uncontrollable systems have? Is this 
ambivalence the basis of interventions in digital cultures?
Alexander R. Galloway: I am thinking of two styles of inter-
vention, two waves even. The first wave is really about 
identifying tactics that are appropriate for technology and 
for networked technology, which is in itself very challenging 
because a lot of the old strategy and tactics from previous 
generations might not be useful or relevant. The second 
wave (or style) is more about transforming the network or 
technology in such a way that it ’s qualitatively different. 
 Let’s consider the first one, with the hacker as a paradigmatic 
model. The hacker is the person who knows how to identify 
a flaw or exploit and take advantage of it. The hacker is 
someone who understands that networks feed on flow and 
exchange. They have a kind of contagious quality, making 
it easy to move things around and get from one place to 
another. The negative side of this, of course, is evident in 
phenomena like spam, email worms, and computer viruses. 
I consider this the “first mode” of intervention. It ’s a mode 
deeply rooted in intervention tactics inherited from the 
1960s or earlier, where concerns focus on mobilization, 
collective action, and seizing territory. I’m thinking of rallying 
cries like “take back the streets” or “seize the media.” At the 
same time, I’m deeply influenced by a group like Critical 
Art Ensemble and particularly their controversial if not 
inflammatory claim that “the streets are dead capital.” In 
other words, people can go and protest in the streets, that’s 
63great, but it ’s a kind of Potemkin village because that’s not 
where power resides. Power isn’t in the streets anymore, 
even as the police control the sidewalk with ever increasing 
violence. The traditional left was scandalized when Critical 
Art Ensemble made that claim, but I think there is something 
to it. Instead they suggest that we should consider 
alternative modes of intervention, particularly what they 
called “electronic civil disobedience.” Today, we might call 
these rhizomatic or network-centric modes of intervention. 
That’s one way to understand the first wave: exploiting the 
affordances of technologies. Some obvious conclusions 
emerge, not least being that blockading networks is useless. 
Distributed networks are typically designed to ignore bot-
tlenecking problems. This presents a problem for classic 
intervention techniques that focus on blocking or seizing 
things (streets, territory, property, etc.). 
 The second wave or style of intervention is not so much 
a question of accelerating the qualities of networks or 
pushing technologies further—what we might call “hyper-
trophy,” where the technology itself continues to define the 
field of action. Instead, the goal is not to let the technology 
define the mode of intervention. The first mode, the hacker 
mode, is like a perfectly formed mirror of technology. But 
the second mode asks: What if there is no mirror? Can we 
simply invent a new world that’s off to the side? I see here a 
whole different set of tactics, particularly tactics like opacity 
and withdrawal. Some people interpret “withdrawal” as 
a kind of technophobia. Either that or as an indication of 
a latent romanticism—that we have to go and live in the 
forest and everything will be pure again. But that’s not what 
appeals to me. I think there’s a lot of interesting work to be 
done here around denying certain forms of digital capture. 
For example, encryption is endlessly fascinating. Even in 
something like the blockchain technology behind bitcoin—
and let’s be clear I’m very skeptical of a lot of the propaganda 
64 around bitcoin, but I do think that the blockchain is really 
interesting in the way that it uses authentication and 
encryption. Ultimately, I’m interested in trying to think about 
things that are not networks. Or things that are not reducible 
to the digital. We live in a kind of “generalized rhizomatics” 
today, so what might the alternatives be? Again, this doesn’t 
mean we have to throw out technology, that we have to 
throw out our computers. It ’s just a point of inquiry: is 
there a way to think about technology that does not already 
assume the dominance of digitality and networks? 
ML: Where are the problems in networked systems that we have 
to intervene in? 
AG: The problems are all the classic problems of society: power, 
injustice, inequality. I’m primarily interested in technologies 
of capture. How do the individual actions of people get 
identified and marked or otherwise captured to be used for 
other purposes? It might be Google following your click trail, 
or Amazon following your buying habits. It ’s a huge topic, I 
admit. Within that topic, a number of issues are worth con-
sideration. Personally, I’m interested in labor and see that 
today we’re going through a new instance of the problem 
of unpaid labor. Capitalism has always relied on things 
it doesn’t pay for. This can come in many forms: natural 
resources or the air, but also unpaid labor, whether it be 
unpaid domestic labor, or even in some cases slave labor 
(or prison labor), or forms of subaltern labor. Today, part of 
this comes under the heading of Web 2.0. Social media are 
very complicated and often hard to define. But at root we’re 
dealing with a form of social interaction almost entirely 
captured and monetized in various ways. It ’s something 
worthy of intervention. Still, some people might be skeptical. 
Who cares? Who cares if Google tracks you, particularly since 
they provide a free email account in exchange? Perhaps this 
is a form of payment, a kind of “wage.” I’m not sure. Still, 
what about all the people who don’t use Gmail but are still 
65subject to capture? As a personal anecdote, my university 
outsourced all of their email to Google, so I’m subject to 
capture at the workplace and I don’t have the ability to “opt 
out” (unless I were to quit my job). In other words, numerous 
people are still caught up by Google and produce value 
that can be gleaned by them. If you make a blog, even if 
you don’t have a Gmail account, Google has access to what 
you’re producing and can feed into this system, extracting 
value. It ’s a crucial point. It may sound hysterical to call 
it a form of unpaid labor but I think it is. It may not be as 
flagrant or violent as other forms of unpaid labor, as in for 
example nineteenth-century industrial Europe, or other 
forms of unpaid labor like slavery. But I do think social media 
perpetuate forms of unpaid labor, and thus warrant our 
concern.
ML: What can Google or Amazon take from my data and what are 
they doing with them?
AG: Often I’ll ask my students, “How does Google make money?” 
Students usually answer that Google sells ads. In a mundane 
sense, it ’s true, they do sell advertisements. But the 
reason that they make money is not just because they sell 
advertisements. They are selling advertisements because 
they are producing some kind of value. How do they produce 
value? Google is able to see the shape of the network. To 
be sure, this shape is incredibly complicated. It ’s this kind 
of fractal, tessellated landscape that’s heterogeneous and 
sophisticated and built out of masses of data. But, never-
theless, Google can see the shape of it—the topology, if 
you will, of this massive database that is the Internet—and 
through the various potential energies that exist in the 
mountains and valleys of this hunk of information, they 
can use such differentials to extract value. In his book A 
Hacker Manifesto (2004), McKenzie Wark talks about vectors, 
and I think that’s a good way to conceive of these energy 
potentials. Identifying high and low points, the vector defines 
66 potential energy within data. It ’s translated very literally 
into what goes at the top of the Google search results and 
what goes further down. But the root question is value. To 
return to the earlier question, this landscape, this network 
topology, these millions and millions of micro-vectors are 
only computable because the networked self has a shape. 
And that shape is not created by Google, it is created by us. 
Google is a gleaner. But we’re the producers. 
ML: That’s what I’m wondering about. We know about the 
regimes and power structures, but we don’t stop producing 
data and supporting Google by doing so. Why?
AG: The web has always thrived on being able to identify the most 
utopian and aspirational things that human beings seem to 
want. Human beings like to communicate and of course they 
like getting things for free, downloading, etc. They like the 
kind of things that cell phones and computers allow them 
to do, to communicate with their friends and family and to 
build things. I am not questioning human aspiration. Still, 
my interest concerns what sorts of infrastructures, com-
munities, and societies can we imagine that attend to human 
aspiration without perpetuating an elite technical class. Can 
we have non-commercial open source models? There’s tons 
of examples of those that are still quite successful today. 
Not to glamorize the origins of the web, but non-commercial 
software and non-commercial infrastructures dominated 
the early years of the Internet. An important historical break 
comes with Web 2.0. Before social media, many of our daily 
tools were powered by open, non-commercial protocols. 
After Web 2.0, a lot of this migrated to commercial platforms. 
(Consider the difference between email or HTML, on the one 
hand, and a tweet or a Facebook status update on the other. 
The former are open protocols, the latter proprietary.) For 
instance, before Web 2.0 a lot of communication took place 
over email. After Web 2.0 a lot of the same kind of activities 
take place on social media platforms. It ’s an interesting 
67historical transformation. Overall, we’re witnessing a with-
ering of the utility of open protocols and an increase in 
commercial platforms.
ML: What might non-commercial platforms look like? 
AG: I’ve always been interested in movements that transfer 
attention and power downward, closer to people and further 
from infrastructures, institutions, states, and commercial 
power. Ad hoc networking has long fascinated me for this 
reason. And it’s curious to me that ad hoc networking has 
never really succeeded, at least on a large scale. The idea 
behind ad hoc networking is that you don’t need an Internet 
backbone at all. Communication jumps immediately from 
device to device in a local sense. Of course, programmers 
have built many different kinds of ad hoc networks, and 
even today there are ways to form such networks using 
Bluetooth, etc. Still, the adoption of ad hoc networking on a 
large scale would represent a dramatic shift. It would require 
compromises, of course. Expecting connectivity 24/7 is not 
going to be realistic under that model. High bandwidth might 
not even be realistic under that model. So, we might need 
to invent alternative forms of communication that make a 
tweet look long! What if the limitation was not 140 characters 
but, I don’t know, a single character? What can you embed in 
one character? How many bits do you actually need? In other 
words, if ad hoc networking is going to work, it would have to 
be a network without a backbone, but it would also have to 
be a network without data. Or at least the data themselves 
would have to become smaller and smaller—which doesn’t 
mean it has to be less useful or less interesting or less 
semantically rich. Those will be the kinds of interesting 
challenges faced by computer scientists and programmers. 
Perhaps we need smaller protocols, nano-protocols. 
ML: But why doesn’t that happen? What would be their political 
value and their level of intervention?
68 AG: It ’s not a technological problem. People know how to build 
it out. It ’s really a social and political problem based around 
power, particularly commercial power. Companies need 
the backbone. AT&T wants you to pay them 100 dollars a 
month for service. The companies that run the fiber-optic 
infrastructure have their cash flow and they need to keep 
it going. Not to perpetuate a conspiracy theory, but it ’s a 
crisis in imagination, meaning it ’s a social challenge rather 
than a technical one. The reason why I brought up ad hoc 
networking in the beginning is that there are quite mundane 
uses of it. If my friend is halfway across town and I want 
to send an email to her I could be using ad hoc networks 
to do just normal day-to-day things. At the same time, I 
could be using it at a protest, since these are the kinds of 
communication technologies needed in protest zones. 
In such protest zones, people often simply use the same 
technologies they use every day. They use Twitter, they use 
email, they’re texting, they’re using other kinds of social 
media apps. The difficulty is that a lot of these systems 
are piped through centralized nodes. Your phone calls and 
your texts go to the nearest phone tower. People talk about 
the revolutionary potential of Twitter, but it ’s still a cen-
tralized authority that mediates communication. How can 
it be a people’s technology? Ad hoc networking would be 
tremendously useful in protests—and in fact it ’s already 
being used. The police can turn off the cell tower. Or they 
can use their so-called Stingray technology, a police device 
that mimics a cell phone tower. People’s phones connect 
to the Stingray, but really their data are being collected. So, 
there’s a lot of immediate reasons why one wouldn’t want to 
have a device that has to go through a commercial or state 
intermediary. 
ML: Then intervention should be thought of as a larger project, a 
larger concept of systems and education. It could be useful 
69to tell people, in workshops for example, how we could do it 
differently. 
AG: And to build these kinds of networks. Because they tend to 
be very local and can be quite small. People are less inter-
ested in Facebook and Twitter these days. I think people are 
interested in smaller systems. Of course, the Internet was 
formed from man’s desire for universality. It makes sense for 
that period in history—perhaps the Internet was invented at 
the last moment that anyone could still contemplate the uni-
versal. I’m not sure that’s the point today. People seem to be 
more interested in certain kinds of bounded conversations, 
bounded forms of connectivity—not local per se but circum-
scribed. For instance, you might not necessarily want to be 
on Facebook or Twitter with 20,000 people. What if you just 
want to talk with 20 people. Several years ago we did it with 
an email list, but now that’s not the flavor. 
ML: All the networked infrastructures are run by algorithms. You 
said in “Are Some Things Unrepresentable?” (Galloway 2012) 
that we can’t make networks or algorithms visible in order to 
understand them. How should we think of and realize inter-
ventions under these conditions?
AG: The first point to make is that data don’t have any necessary 
visual form. One might even go further and say that numbers 
as such don’t have a necessary visual form. Yes, you could 
put two apples on this table and claim some necessary 
“twoness” there. Still it ’s not entirely clear what data are, 
and even less clear what they look like. I could show you a 
hunk of data on a disc, and what would you see? What do 
voltage differentials look like? It ’s just not entirely clear. 
Therein lies the problem of data visualization and the basic 
challenge of information aesthetics. Still, what’s fascinating 
is how similar data visualizations tend to be. If you were to 
google the phrase “map of the Internet” you would come 
up with endless representations of the Internet—and yet 
70 they all look the same. There’s a contradiction there. Infor-
mation aesthetics exists, sure. But the picture of data is not 
pre-given. Of course, there are counter examples, but they 
prove the rule. Sometimes I describe this in terms of genre 
and claim that, today, genre is much more powerful than 
its putative opposite (modernism, the avant-garde, etc.). If 
genre indicates the dominance of a certain set of aesthetic 
expectations—the genre of science fiction, the genre of the 
western, the genre of the landscape or the portrait—we’re 
living today through a “genre phase” for digital aesthetics, 
not a modern phase, or an avant-garde phase. It ’s almost like 
a new International Style, where the modern impulse evolves 
so far as to produce global uniformity. 
 The second point—and I sometimes get criticized for saying 
this but I think it ’s true—is that algorithms are incredibly 
uniform when it comes to the kinds of ideals and principles 
built into them. Algorithms tend to follow very specific 
structures. They tend to privilege a very limited number of 
virtues, virtues like expediency, efficiency, transparency, 
and clarity. There is a whole literature in computer science 
on what makes a good algorithm. What makes it well-
functioning, what makes an algorithm beautiful or “elegant.” 
Still, what about all of the things that have been eliminated 
from the conversation? What about an algorithm that isn’t 
efficient? What about a stupid algorithm? What about a 
boring algorithm? What about a whimsical algorithm? What 
about an algorithm that is destructive? An algorithm that 
is pathological? A sad algorithm? Entire areas of human 
activity have been ignored in the development of computer 
programs and computer algorithms. Those are the ones that 
I’m really interested in. A number of people have started 
to explore this area. For instance, computer science has 
historically been dominated by men, and so some have 
attempted to write so-called feminist algorithms, even create 
feminist computer languages—with various levels of success, 
71and often eliciting vociferous antifeminist responses. 
You can’t imagine the level of anger that comes out of the 
Internet when someone endeavors to create a feminist 
algorithm. What would it mean to try to assign these kinds 
of socio-political categories to something that is supposed 
to be immune to that realm, given that it ’s “just” a technical 
device—a false myth, to be sure. A few years ago, I started 
writing something called the Liberated Computer Language, 
an attempt to make a computer language that has nothing 
to do with the tradition of algorithmic research and devel-
opment. It can’t be run on any existing computer—it’s not 
that kind of language—but these are the kinds of exper-
iments I find the most interesting. 
ML: But all modes of alternative networks would need a running 
code. If I may compare it to the Netart in the 90s, intervening 
in the Internet with noise and disruptions. These needed 
well-done, running code. What would be the concept of inter-
ventions in alternative networks and codes?
AG: You are identifying a key problem. The underlying technology 
relies on the concept of functionality—quite literally on 
functions themselves. The function is a very low-level 
technology in computer science. It comes by different names: 
the method, the sub-routine, the function. Of course, the 
function is also a central technology in mathematics, from 
which computer science borrows a great deal. The challenge 
is thus incredibly hard. It ’s like trying to write a novel without 
using the alphabet. Often artists are forced into a double-
bind, either write code that works, or write code that crashes 
the computer. There’s almost no other option. And we all 
know how easy it is to crash a computer. Computers crash 
all the time. The most interesting artists are those who can 
strangle the computer, not crash it. To strangle the computer 
72 in a beautiful way. I’m thinking of artists like Jodi.1 They are 
an excellent example of this sort of computer strangulation 
that produces beautiful outcomes. Of course, Jodi write 
code. They’re totally technically literate and have a lot of 
skill. But they are using their skills to make the machine 
work in ways that it wasn’t intended to work. In essence, we 
still don’t know what machines are capable of, because so 
much of the effort over the years has been to try to produce 
machines that function correctly. Why don’t we put our 
attention somewhere else? I’m sure we’ll be able to discover 
endless amounts of interesting, creative possibilities. Instead 
of being monomaniacally focused on efficiency, function, 
expedience, outcomes, production—what if we pursue 
different virtues?
References
Galloway, Alexander R. 2012. “Are Some Things Unrepresentable?” In The Interface 
Effect, 78–100. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Accessed March 11, 2017. http://
journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0263276411423038.
Wark, McKenzie. 2004. A Hacker Manifesto. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
1 Jodi, or jodi.org, is a collective of two Internet artists: Joan Heemskerk 
(Netherlands) and Dirk Paesmans (Belgium).

  HABITS  
  DIFFERENCE  
		HOMOPHILY	 	
  PERFORMING  
  QUEERING  
  INFRASTRUCTURES  
  DISCOMFORT  
  QUEERING  
[ 4 ]
Intervening in Habits  
and Homophily:  
Make	a	Difference!
An Interview with Wendy Hui Kyong Chun 
by Martina Leeker
In this interview, Wendy Hui Kyong Chun com-
ments	on	different	aspects	of	the	constitution	
of digital cultures. Habits are viewed as infra-
structures, and homophily (the principle that 
like breeds like), which currently grounds 
network analysis and fosters segregation, is 
called into question. Given these interventions, 
methods	for	engaging	differences	and	queering	
homophily	are	highlighted	in	order	to	redefine	
comfort and discomfort. 
76 Infrastructure as Habits 
Martina Leeker: For our volume on interventions in digital 
cultures, I would like to speak with you about their 
technological and other conditions that we need to under-
stand in order to intervene in them. Is there one critical point 
in digital cultures where it would be best to intervene? Where 
would it be best to start?
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun: I think you have to intervene at all 
levels: from hardware, protocols, software, and user inter-
actions to how these are embedded in various economic 
and social systems and imaginaries. We need to constantly 
ask: Why are things the way they are? Since there is no one 
critical point, it is important to keep prodding at all levels. 
Also, we need to create broad coalitions because people 
have different forms of expertise: some work intimately 
with algorithms and machine learning and thus can help us 
rethink those algorithms (for example someone like Cathy 
O’Neil and her Weapons of Math Destruction (2016)); others 
focus on user interactions and social media. Again, what’s 
crucial is that there are many different places to intervene 
and no one person can do everything. 
ML: Absolutely, but we also have to realize that infrastructures 
are a big topic today, as technological fundament of digital 
cultures, constituted as networks, driven by algorithms. The 
question is: How do we intervene in them? To find an answer 
we need, of course, an analysis of their constitution, first of 
all. 
WC: For me, the question of infrastructure is not simply 
technological—or human. For instance, my last book 
(Chun 2016) looked at habit as infrastructure. Habit, after 
all, is “second nature”: it is something that is built rather 
than given at birth—it is not instinct. At the same time, it 
is nonconscious: it is in muscle memory and so “below” 
77consciousness. Like infrastructure, it lies beneath. Habit also 
unfolds through constant repetition. Why is this important? 
Because sometimes work in the growing and important field 
of infrastructure studies tends to focus on technology, at the 
cost of human interaction, as though infrastructures were 
only technical.
ML: How do habits function? What is their most significant effect? 
WC: Habits link us to the past, to old, seemingly obsolete 
technologies that live on in our interactions. Friends or the 
practice of “friending” has lived on past the demise of Friend-
ster as a social networking site. Edsger Dijkstra, an early 
pioneer in structural programming, cautioned that machines 
and software foster certain habits of thinking, which 
fundamentally affect a programmer’s mind. Habits mark 
openings in our bodies—we learn habits from others and in 
response to our environment. Most provocatively, habits are 
scars of others that live on in our repeated actions. Habit and 
infrastructures both support actions—and they also remain 
in intriguing ways. Habit provides a necessary counterpoint 
to rhetoric about disruption and new media as being viral. 
The fact that crises happen is not really that surprising. What 
is surprising and interesting is what remains after a disrup-
tion. The question is: What does a disruption make habitual? 
ML: It seems that companies like Amazon try to make use of 
habits, for example, in the sense that they try to predict 
them via algorithms. So, another aspect comes up in this 
context, which is prediction. What do you think about the 
predictive potential of algorithms? 
WC: They are fundamentally predictive; however, there is no way 
of absolutely verifying the results of these recommendation 
systems. Consider the Netflix prize, when Netflix offered a 
huge part of its database and a cash reward to any group 
that could improve its recommendation system by 10%. It 
awarded the prize, however, to the group that could best 
78 predict the past, that is, a part of its database that was 
initially hidden. This is because it is really hard to know 
what role any recommendation plays: How do you know a 
user wouldn’t have bought a book regardless of the rec-
ommendation? How do you know a user wouldn’t have 
bought any item that was recommended?
Homophily: Love of the Same in Networks
ML: I would like to bring in your work on homophily as a crucial 
model that has to be mentioned in the context of concep-
tualizing interventions. Could you explain the technological 
and conceptual sides of homophily?
WC: Well, you cannot disentangle the two. Homophily began as a 
sociological concept, which then became embedded within 
network algorithms as the easiest way to understand how 
connections form and remain. The term homophily came 
from two sociologists, Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), who 
were trying to understand different friendship formations. 
In their 1954 article, “Friendship As Social Process: A Sub-
stantive and Methodological Analysis,” they coined both the 
terms “homophily” and “heterophily” (inspired by friend-
ship categorizations of the allegedly “savage Trobianders 
whose native idiom at least distinguishes friendships within 
one’s in-group from friendships outside this social circle”). 
In it, they analyzed friendship patterns within two towns: 
“Craftown, a project of some seven hundred families in New 
Jersey, and Hilltown, a bi-racial, low-rent project of about 
eight hundred families in western Pennsylvania” (Lazars-
feld and Merton 1954, 18–88, 23, 21). Crucially, they did not 
assume homophily as a grounding principle, nor did they find 
homophily to be “naturally” present. Rather, documenting 
both homophily and heterophily, they asked: “What are 
the dynamic processes through which the similarity or 
opposition of values shape the formation, maintenance, and 
79disruption of close friendships?” (Lazarsfeld and Merton 
1954, 28). What is interesting is that—although this article is 
cited all the time—the breadth of its analysis, conclusions, 
and case studies are ignored. Network science now largely 
assumes that homophily, which is love of the same, is 
natural—that similarity automatically breeds connections. 
Thus, recommendation systems place you in segregated 
neighborhoods based on your intense likes and dislikes. As 
it ’s become a grounding principle, the world has become 
more and more homophilious. It does not just describe the 
world—it also now prescribes and shapes it.
ML: And then you go on to say that homophily is a way of creating 
segregation.
WC: Homophily is segregation. It assumes that love is love of the 
same, that you would naturally love to be around people 
like yourself, so therefore, segregation is natural. At the 
same time, homophily—because it emphasizes the actions 
of individual agents—erases the importance of institutions, 
economics, and legal structures (hence my emphasis on 
habit as infrastructure and the ways in which habits but-
tress/engage/are part of institutions, economics, etc.). 
ML: What about heterosexuality? Can it be seen as homophily 
because it is a norm?
WC: Heterosexuality is actually a contradictory case: technically 
it ’s called “reverse homophily.” Since many systems assume 
strong gender homophily, heterosexuality is an anomaly.
ML: How did you come up with the idea of working on homophily?
WC: Through an extensive literature search on networks, by 
reading textbooks.
ML: There are so many concepts of the “one and only correct 
theory” on digital cultures. Depending on the insights, they 
develop completely different concepts on interventions. How 
80 do you find the evidence of homophily? Homophily seems to 
be a point in which technology, the conceptual, and real pol-
itics come together.
WC: Most generally, I start with the fundamental concepts. I try to 
think as basically as possible in all disciplines and ask: Why 
is this concept important? What does it assume or mean? A 
lot of this work came from an earlier investigation into the 
predominance of networks across disciplines. I asked myself: 
What does a network mean across disciplines? What is a 
node or an edge? 
ML: Could we still compare this approach to Friedrich Kittler’s 
media-theoretical and media-epistemological tradition, the 
idea that we have to go back to technology in order to find 
the crucial points? Is homophily today’s techno-culture? 
WC: Homophily is basic on a different level. Homophily as a con-
cept does not work at the level of electronics: if anything, 
heterophily drives electromagnetism. I’m also a little wary of 
Kittler’s arguments based on his understanding of software.
Intervening in Homophily
ML: This concept of homophily, of loving the same, has been 
applied to network studies and their technology, configuring 
how networks and algorithms work?
WC: Clustered, how networks are clustered.
ML: Would it make sense for intervening in homophily to go to 
other logic concepts such as Gotthard Günther’s trans-clas-
sical logic, or Heinz von Foerster’s concepts of non-trivial 
machines?
WC: I think you need to change it on multiple levels. But I do think 
that reworking network algorithms and recommendation 
systems is really important, because we live in a world where 
the information we get is so selected—and it’s selected 
81based not only on our history, but people considered to be 
“like us.” It ’s key that we rethink homophily both online and 
offline. I think we need, again, to have many critical points of 
intervention.
ML: In your texts, you mention the work of D. Fox Harrell1 as an 
example of intervening in homophily. Could you comment on 
his approach to interventions? 
WC: Actually, I view Fox as intervening into network science 
more generally. Fox builds systems and creative artificial 
intelligences (AIs). He creates different experiences that 
force us to rethink social biases. At the same time, he 
refuses to make race, gender, class, etc. simply static and 
immutable categories. Part of his work confronts you with 
discrimination and works from theories from Erving Goffman 
(1956) regarding stigma. 
ML: So, it ’s a way of implementing technologically but also on the 
conceptual level, differences, in order to make us think with 
differences, or to see things differently?
WC: Or to imagine dialog differently. His work comes from the 
tradition of electronic literature. So, his question is: Can AI be 
like great literature? Can it be like Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man 
(1952)?2 Can reading it change the world? Vi Hart and Nicky 
Case’s Parable of the Polygons—a really excellent reworking of 
Schelling’s segregation model—is also an excellent example.
1 For the work of D. Fox Harrell (2013), see: http://www.foxharrell.com/. “Fox 
Harrell is a researcher exploring the relationship between imaginative 
cognition and computation and his research involves developing new forms 
of computational narrative, gaming, social media, and related digital media 
based in computer science, cognitive science, and digital media arts. He 
aims to push the boundaries of how computers can be used for creative 
expression and social empowerment.”
2 A novel about a black man rendered invisible by race struggle and its con-
sequence: a precarious constitution of identity. 
82 Methods	for	Differences	
ML: What kind of interventions do you see for intervening 
in homophily by making differences? You speak about 
performance?
WC: Yes, I speak about performance partly in response to those 
who argue that because our actions are captured and are 
given more weight than our words, we can no longer give 
an account of ourselves. This may be true, but our actions 
aren’t simply captured—they are shaped into what Phil Agre 
(1994) has called grammars of action. Capture systems, he 
argues, are based on a metaphor of human activity as a 
kind of language. So, they store, shape, and rearticulate our 
actions: they form them into grammars of how things should 
be done. The point is: even when we’re simply doing things, 
we’re still speaking. We thus need to rearticulate certain 
grammars and try to create different ones.
ML: Can we link this to Judith Butler’s concept of the perfor-
mativity of, for example, gender, or race (Butler 1990)? Her 
approach to intervening comes from Derrida’s concept of 
iteration. It is about a kind of transforming of inscriptions by 
performing them. Could performing be like a silver bullet for 
diverse kinds of levels (technologically, by theater pieces, via 
artistic installations) in order to bring an ethic of difference 
into the world? Or, do we have to take into account problem-
atic points of performance?
WC: At a base level, we can say that we are always performing. 
Even when we are being captured in seemingly spontaneous 
ways. Think, for instance, of how Donald Trump has become 
“authentic” and how he used reality TV to shape this 
authenticity. Reality TV, of course, is highly scripted and 
inauthentic: so, what is considered to be authentic now is 
completely scripted and performed. Thus, one argument is 
we’re performing at all times. Judith Butler, amongst others, 
83of course, has argued that identities are always performative 
and there is thus the possibility that things might go astray. 
But there are also of course many other arguments within 
performance studies, as well as Erving Goffman’s work (1956) 
on the social as itself a performance. There is a long tradition 
of thinking through those terms. 
ML: Would you recommend a movement of transdisciplinary 
concerted action by people from different fields making 
something like a net all over the world with rethinking and 
re-performing? If so, how can scholars from the humanities, 
or artists, work together with computer scientists and people 
from network theory in order to change homophily?
WC: If network science looks the way it does, it is in part because 
of the sociological theories it favors—that is, theories that 
are relatively easier to model. It is already fundamentally 
interdisciplinary. It is a question of getting different types 
of theory into network science. But that clearly is not 
enough—we need interventions at all levels. For example, 
to combat abusive speech online, we need many different 
forms of expertise: from those natural language process-
ing folk to ethnic studies. For interdisciplinary work to 
succeed, we need to start with a topic that everyone cares 
about and realizes is very difficult to solve using one’s own 
methodology alone. 
Queering and Discomfort 
ML: In artistic interventions, we see “queering” as a method of 
introducing difference and attacking homophily today. Thus, 
looking at the history of queer studies and the hype about 
queering, could there be a problem? If we are multiple and 
should always be different, could these concepts unwillingly 
support the politics and economy of, for example, gene 
technology or neoliberal governmentality? Aren’t critique 
and intervention always eaten by the systems they live in?
84 WC: It is—there is no position that is not compromised and this 
is why queer theory is so important. Queer theory itself 
has also changed over the years. To just assume it is simply 
about drag is not correct—Sara Ahmed’s3 (2010) more recent 
work, for instance, about discomfort is really interesting, as 
well as Kara Keeling’s work on queer OS (operating systems) 
(2014). Queer is best understood as a verb, a certain mode of 
operation. It can never simply be one thing. It also cannot be 
the solution to everything. There needs to be different ways 
of engaging things. Perhaps one way to queer homophily is 
to actually make it heterosexual. 
ML: This means also going against the normalization of, for 
example, the heterosexual concept of family in homosexual 
relationships? 
WC: I think the fact that heterosexuality both challenges homo-
phily and reveals that homophily is hardly queer. Homosexu-
ality and queerness aren’t the same thing. But to be clear, 
homophily as love of the same does not even come close to 
doing justice to homosexuality.
ML: It seems that we have to be very precise and very 
differentiated in thinking about differences and queering. 
Perhaps some training in permanent discomfort could be a 
promising way?
WC: Homophily is constantly discussed as being comfortable, 
but it is hardly comfortable. If you’re around people who are 
always like yourself, it is horrible. Think of something like 
segregated groups—these are filled with angry people. So, 
part of dealing with this is to refuse this offer of a comfort 
that is no comfort and to realize that what is allegedly com-
fortable is anything but comfortable. 
3 See also Sara Ahmed’s Blog “feministkilljoys,” available at https://fem-
inistkilljoys.com/. 
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P/occupy	Milieus:	The	
Human Microphone and  
the Space between 
Protesters
Ulrike Bergermann 
A	political	movement	trying	to	find	new	
modes of communication, representation, and 
decision-making	cannot	use	well-known	media,	
especially when “representation” is contested. 
Can one voice speak for many people? Is the 
parliamentary mode of speaking for others to 
be	overcome?	In	2011,	the	protesters	of	“Occupy	
Wall Street” looked for other medialities and 
tried	new	“soft	technologies”	like	the	so-called	
human microphone. This article connects its 
use	to	Jean-Luc	Nancy’s	concept	of	“being-with”	
as	part	of	an	ontology	of	a	non-hierarchical	
thinking, and asks for the possibility of adopting 
it—even	where	the	“co-appearing”	people	have	
not been equally “co” (given their educational, 
racialized, and gendered backgrounds) in the 
first	place	when	they	became	part	of	the	“media	
politics	of	being-with.”
An intervention is something that comes in between. Digital culture 
is a term vaguely denoting a culture that makes use of digital 
tools—or perhaps a mode of the digital tools’ functioning. In any 
case, the title Interventions in Digital Cultures evokes the idea of 
halting fluidity, of blocking a space through which something 
is moving. Is any contemporary political action conceivable 
without the use of digital media? Are the images of resistance 
versus fluidity, of a rage against an ongoing machine—like in 
the famous story of the sabots, the wooden clogs thrown into 
sewing machines by eighteenth century factory workers to stop 
them taking over jobs—pervasive in all “interventions in digital 
cultures” thinking? If we consider the digital in terms of ubiquity, 
miniaturization, and connectedness, we see ourselves immersed 
in it with ever fewer spaces for pauses in communication and 
control. If we turn to the operational mode of “the digital,” we 
might consider differential models of zeros and ones, of “on and 
off,” and here, the concept of an intervention would not make too 
much sense either, as a myriad differences may offer a myriad in-
between spaces to enter, and so the idea of intervention becomes 
intervention ad absurdum. At the same time, there did occur at a 
certain moment an intervention, a blockade that lacked digital (or 
any electric amplified) media in communication, which allowed 
for a fluidity, a being-in-motion within a radical democratic tactic.
A “social technology” called “human microphone” regained 
political and theoretical popularity during Occupy Wall Street’s 
(OWS) occupation of Manhattan’s Zuccotti Park in the fall of 2011.1 
1 See Graeber 2011, 2013; Geiges 2014; Bryne 2012; Blumenkranz et al. 2011; 
Schwartz 2011; Mörtenböck and Mooshammer 2012. For the following, see 
Bergermann 2016a, focusing on the category of “individual experience” by 
Marina Garcés. Thanks to Daniel Ladnar and Nanna Heidenreich for critical 
readings.
89Cut off from electricity and in need of amplification for their 
voices to communicate, OWS protesters reactivated the 1970s 
tactic of the human microphone in their assemblies: a person 
indicated they had something to say by calling “Mic check!” and 
the multiple answer “Mic check!” would start the process. After 
a few words, the speaker would have to pause so that people 
standing close enough to hear could conjointly repeat what 
they had said. One voice amplified by many, a process that 
could be repeated for those standing further away. Response 
had to be slow and was managed through hand gestures and 
lists of speakers. The human microphone was seen as a tool of 
a “real democracy” in which everybody should have a voice, as 
opposed to only one voice being heard as a representative of 
the many. “Democracy, not representation” is the oft-quoted 
interpretational formula of OWS.2 Ordinarily, protesters demand 
specific political actions, but in this movement there was a denial 
of such an all too ready set of meanings and a claim of starting 
to find out what the demands of all participants were.3 It was 
thus characterized by the ways discussions were held, decisions 
were made, and new procedures were undertaken—instead of a 
reliance on chosen representatives to speak, there was a radical 
inclusion of the many. 
While parts of Media Studies were fascinated by the model of 
the swarm, because it could picture social behavior as technoid, 
2 See the discussion by Isabell Lorey 2012. She unfolds the European model of 
democracy as grounded on principles of the representation of the people, 
designates these representational principles as an enclosure of a “power 
of the many” and of the fear of the masses (Lorey, 16–20, 27f.), and explains 
the occupations as a symptom of a “desire of the many” for a non-rep-
resentational democracy in search of its form. 
3 Another one would be the slogan “We are the 99%,” as Jens Kastner argued: 
you cannot assume a unity of the 99%, neither theoretically nor empirically, 
but a unity should be considered as one always “under construction,” in con-
stant becoming. Nonetheless, it is the majority that suffers from the financial 
crisis, so one might think of a metaphorical 99% (a metaphor for “almost 
everybody”). The majority, however, does not share one point of view, not a 
single voice (Kastner 2012, 67).
90 and count the traditional humanistic ideas of responsibility and 
self-reflection out of it, the human microphone does address the 
question of the source of a message. First, in sending: speakers 
with prominent names were not especially welcomed (and the 
fact that three or four can be found on YouTube is a reminder 
of the fact that the usual suspects cannot be found). Secondly, 
in self-reflection: the regulated, quasi-automatic repetition of a 
message challenges its critical revision. This soft technology of an 
intervention thrills scholars who love fuzzy problems, not clean 
solutions. A lot about OWS’s mic can be found in sociological and 
political writings (see Gould-Wartofsky 2015; Geiges 2014; Graeber 
2011); philosophers in various genres discussed the human mic 
in terms of “the singular and the many” (see Nancy [1995] 2000; 
Kastner et al. 2012; Marchart 2013), artistic research analyzed 
its sound practices (Woodruff 2014;4 Kretzschmar 2014), and 
it might be related further to cultural histories and discursive 
figures like the chorus, interpellation, or call and response.5 
Sound technologies and their respective philosophies have 
been invoked. While amplification organizes participation and 
silencing, the new assemblies of the 2010s rely heavily on the 
voice in that the spoken word is part of a multi-media network of 
computers, smartphones, and social media, and in that the idea 
of “direct democracy” calls for presence and orality.
The practical use of the human microphone recalls the old con-
cept of the figure of hearing-oneself-speak, or rather: hearing-
oneself-and-the-other-speak. A set of accompanying hand 
gestures is supposed to indicate whether the listener/speaker 
agrees or objects, even while repeating what was said, so that 
speech never has to be disrupted. The question of how pos-
sible objections can be seen by all, how they might affect the 
flow of speech, etc. is left open. Kretzschmar even welcomes 
4 Thanks to artist Anna Bromley for this information; see also her work 
“Occupy Karaoke,” available at: http://www.annabromley.com/occupy-
karaoke-2013.html.
5 With a focus on the questions of sound see Bergermann 2016b.
91the “amplification of affect” (2014, 155) through the human mic.6 
“Authenticity,” in any case, remains coupled with the voice (even 
though the “pathos of presence” goes hand in hand with an over-
load of documentary practices, pictures, protocols, video clips, 
etc.). Even the gross simplification of messages transmitted by 
the human mic does not worry its advocates, who argue that it 
was in the pauses between repetitions that people would think 
and formulate precise wording, that the need for short messages 
would lead to a concentration and compression of content, and 
that the slowing down of communication, the conscious decel-
eration, would postpone the moment of political positioning, in 
a step back from points of view that seem all too readily avail-
able (Kim 2011). The linking, even short-circuiting, of traditional 
polarities—understood as a new political aesthetics—belongs, 
I would argue, to the human/technologies/imaginary network 
called human mic.
Dissonance/Unison
Black feminist activist and theorist Angela Davis, in her use of the 
human mic, criticized its unifying mode of speaking and proposed 
producing “dissonance, not unity, a noise in the system.”7 Never-
theless, more often than not, the opposite has been praised. 
Mattathias Schwartz, the New Yorker’s conservative commentator, 
conceded that the point of OWS was its form and the slogan “We 
are our demands” (2011, n.p.): the medium was the message; 
form followed function. Some writers embraced a “suspension 
6 The crowd would be “bodily taken over by the spirit of the speech” and 
would “throw back this enchantment immediately” (Kretzschmar 2014, 
157). In political theory, the importance of the liveness of speaking has been 
underlined since the French Revolution, as orality has been seen as an 
antidote to the corruption of the Ancien Régime; Mladen Dolar, on the other 
hand, has criticized the “political fiction” that democracy was a question of 
immediacy and as such a question of the voice (Dolar 2006).
7 Angela Davis at Zuccotti Park, October 30, 2011: “How Can We Be Together/ In 
a Unity/ That Is Not/ Simplistic/ And Oppressive...” (Woodruff 2014, 145). See 
Žižek’s (2013) speech at Zuccotti Park: “Don’t Fall in Love with Yourselves.”
92 of difference,” as if Derrida’s well-known critique of phonocen-
trism had been overcome: extend a repetition of something 
spoken to many people, they argued, and regardless of the space 
in-between them a sort of hearing-oneself-speak, or hearing-
oneself-and-the-other-speak would occur, collectively.8 However, 
Derrida’s reading of Husserl had brought up a differentiation 
between the outer and the inner perception of one’s own speech 
act, which allows for the perception of spoken words as self-
produced and thus to perceive the voice of the other as your 
own (Linz 2006, 58; Derrida [1967] 2000); the break (caesura) was 
fundamental here (Linz 2006, 58). While a romantic desire to 
merge the one and the many may be part of the imaginary of 
the human microphone, there are other images and readings as 
well: multi-voicedness, the manifold (Mannigfaltigkeit), as Gerald 
Raunig notes, promotes a multiplicity of voices, an ongoing 
enfolding of the utterance9 (2012, 123f). The single voices are not 
in uni-son, but resonate in different ways: in synchronization. This 
is not to say that the synchronized parts need one common pulse 
generator (like a hidden center). Kai van Eikels finds collective 
forms that have no representation as a whole (as group, party 
or even “movement,” and even without the parts being aware of 
being a part [Raunig 2013, 12]) to be necessary and, what is more, 
finds the difference between the “parts” of these collectives to be 
8 Woodruff asserts that the human mic often delivered “more lyrics than 
prose” (2014, 9). Kretzschmar states that the sense of the messages was 
often acoustically diverted into the bodies of the many “up to the sus-
pension of the sense of the words” (2014, 157).
9 While van Eikels sees no need for a common script for the many, and Nancy 
sketches com-munity as the effect of a continuous passing, a Deleuzianian 
approach takes a different direction. Raunig proposes a “new schizo-
competency” in making use of the “social-machinic relations out of which the 
enunciations of the multiple emerge” (2013, n. p.; see 2012, 124f). Whoever 
says “I” in speaking, listening or repeating speaks as a machinic subjectivity; 
this “I” does not aim at a perfect, unequivocal unison, but enunciates her 
own position, blurs author and audience, produces noises and multiple 
sounds as well, not in accordance but in consonance (2012, 125).
93essential, too: without it, there would be no synchronization.10 No 
intervals, it could be added, no intervention. 
The	(Mediated)	Condition	of	Being-With
Another conception of “parts and the whole” also reads like a 
theory of assemblies and their manifestations. A retroactive 
reading of Jean-Luc Nancy’s ontology of being-with addresses 
the one and the many of the assembly. His notion of being-with 
conceives of no temporal (or logical or any other kind of) priority 
of one over the other; there is no “we” prior to the subject, and 
no “I” before the community. Existence is always already coex-
istence, the singular does not come before the plural and vice 
versa: the world is “singularly plural and plurally singular” (Nancy 
[1995] 2000, xiv).
Nancy’s attempt to rethink community without ideal subject or 
subjectivity, but through “being with,” where neither I nor we 
are prior to the other and where existence is coexistence, does 
not aim at “being within a certain group” but at a set of mutual 
relations. “People… can only be grasped in the paradoxical 
simultaneity of togetherness (anonymous, confused, and indeed 
massive) and disseminated singularity.” What is said in the 
context of a philosophy of being could be a test run for a very 
manifest form of togetherness, perhaps during the event of an 
occupation—in an attempt to paraphrase Nancy: the being is 
singular plural. You always start within the alterity of someone. 
Co-appearance does not mean to come out into a light, but 
being in the simultaneity of being-with, where there is no being 
as such (an sich) that is not instantaneously with. There is not 
10 In talking about the politics of the streets, Judith Butler reminded us that 
“we can only be dispossessed because we are always already dispossessed.” 
Greek philosopher Athena Athanasiou replied that it is not the same to “be” 
dispossessed, on the one hand, and “to become” or “be made” dispossessed, 
on the other. The language of philosophy here is just not in sync with the 
language of political life (see Athanasiou and Butler 2013, 5).
94 a presence that is not a representation, spectacular, exposed, 
always co-existing. Being with/togetherness is a trait of being. 
Needless to say, no one would join a demonstration if there was 
nobody else, but there is more to think of in the midst of ontology 
and occupation here. People do not come in natural priorities 
and they are only insofar as they are already connected (Nancy 
dislikes the vocabulary of modern media, and he problematizes 
the inherent prioritizations of verbs and their propositions, so 
he uses the simple formula of being-with). If everything that is 
“passes between us, still,” “between” is not the name of a space, 
it does not lead from one to the other, it is not connective tissue: 
between is the distance of the singular. “There is no mi-lieu 
[between place].” Difference has no representation, no place, no 
extension, and no thing was that was not with, cum,11 as there is 
no natural state of being before the being was connected. 
These well-known figures of deconstructive thought are trans-
ferred into an ontology, which can be indicated through the 
medium of language, maybe of writing (as in the hyphen between 
being-with), but overall, the price for this “horizontalism” is 
mediation: in theorizing the “with,” there seems to be little to no 
concern for the “through”: difference is not crucial. There is no 
mi-lieu, writes Nancy, nothing in between the one and the other, 
no instrument, no medium: “Everything passes between us” 
(Nancy [1995] 2000, 5).12 The materiality of communication falls 
11 What is proper to community, then, is given to us in the following way: it 
has no other resource to appropriate except the “with” that constitutes it, 
the cum of “community,” its interiority without an interior, and maybe even 
its interior intimo sui. As a result, this cum is the cum of a co-appearance, 
wherein we do nothing but appear together with one another, co-appearing 
before no other authority [l ’instance] than this “with” itself, the meaning of 
which seems to us to instantly dissolve into insignificance, into exteriority, 
into the inorganic, empirical, and randomly contingent [aléatoire] inconsis-
tency of the pure and simple “with” (Nancy [1995] 2000, 63).
12 “This ‘between,’ as its name implies, has neither a consistency nor continuity 
of its own. It does not lead from one to the other; it constitutes no con-
nective tissue, no cement, no bridge. Perhaps it is not even fair to speak of 
a ‘connection’ to its subject; it is neither connected nor unconnected; it falls 
95out of focus here, although even speech acts are based on such 
a materiality. Seen from Nancy’s perspective, the sound of the 
human mic would be eventful—it passes through bodies, space, 
resonances without any impediment whatsoever. The materiality 
and mediality of the bodies involved are playing different roles, 
though.
Temperature	Checks	and	P/occupiers
Some were looking for the leaders, initiators and authors of 
OWS, some Adbusters tried to situate themselves as triggers 
and heroes of the movement (Geiges 2014, 79; Schwartz 2011; 
White 2017), and others may have been projecting ideas of self-
emerging multitudes, but it was a participatory observer who, 
in fine detail, rewrote the histories of many small and greater 
movements, initiatives, and their technologies, writings and 
postings, that had to come together (Gould-Wartofsky 2015). And 
they could not have worked just as a sum of the old organizations 
and techniques. The search for new “social technologies” 
needed small inventions like the “temperature check.” In order 
to manage what might happen in crowds between chaos and a 
fixed program, for example, to measure/feel when it might be a 
good point in time to start a discussion (people might be either 
too exhausted, too upset, too distracted, or eager to get a dis-
cussion going at times), several “facilitators” would spread across 
the place and exchange their impressions of the mood in what 
in sum would be called a “temperature check” (Gould-Wartofsky 
2015, 49). It was a kind of organizing of processes that was not 
upfront and could be removed quickly, with regard to possible 
short of both; even better, it is that which is at the heart of a connection, 
the interlacing [l ’entrecroisement] of strands whose extremities remain sep-
arate even at the very center of the knot. The ‘between’ is the stretching out 
[distension] and distance opened by the singular as such, as its spacing of 
meaning…. there is no intermediate and mediating ‘milieu’” (Nancy [1995] 
2000, 5).
96 dynamics.13 And there were sets of rules, too, regulating how 
to find out what to agree upon—rules that were always open to 
change, but could be referred to, nonetheless, like the “modified 
consensus” or the set of hand gestures [fig. 1, 2] (Gould-Wartofsky 
2015, 8)—so it is not simply a super majority (as opposed to the 
1% of the population that owns more than half of the country’s 
wealth14) that the slogan “We are the 99%” invents, but new mech-
anisms for communication among people, one might say: new 
political technologies. 
[Fig. 1] Occupy Hand Signals (Source: Wikipedia 2011).
13 It was criticized as well, for example by the anarchists of Occupy Oakland: 
facilitators would have been unable to “reconcile Occupy’s horizontal 
process with its hierarchical inner life” (Gould-Wartofsky 2015, 105).
14 Joseph Stiglitz wrote in Vanity Fair (“Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%,” May 
2011) that 1% of US citizens earned 25% of all the income and owned 38% 
of the nation’s wealth; in 2016, “1% of the world’s population will own more 
wealth than the other 99%” (Elliott and Pilkington 2015).
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[Fig. 2] Occupy Hand Signals, Chart, London 2011 (Source: Wikipedia 2011).
Gould-Wartofsky often describes the sound of the meetings 
including the clicks of the camera shutters, that is: their mediated 
surroundings and their traces (Gould-Wartofsky 2015, 64 et 
passim) (while also warning of a “fetishization of process over 
strategies,” 105). If the human mic was an invention, when did 
it emerge? It comes back to two astonishing sources: first, an 
unplanned “dress rehearsal” that occurred when (on October 17, 
2011) some men and women stood on benches at Liberty Park 
and others standing below started repeating the messages, and 
second—or first—an older movement. 
Initially, the technique was an adaptation of a long-standing 
practice in American direct action movements, from civil 
rights to global justice, in which participants would chant, 
sing, or communicate information by way of call-and-
response. The innovation lay in the everyday use of call-and-
response, not only as a means of communication, but also 
98 as a mode of decision-making and community organizing 
(Gould-Wartofsky 2015, 67). 
While inventions have histories, there is the need for oppor-
tunity, for chance and coincidence, to implement them. To come 
together, inventions need infrastructures, privately owned public 
spaces (POPS),15 hardware and software, and many people who 
have patience, who remember histories and take responsibilities 
without claiming center stage. This “many” may, nonetheless, 
prove not to encompass “all.” Not everybody had equal access 
to the human mic. As Gould-Wartofsky wrote after taking part 
in OWS and collecting mountains of footage, writings, and 
photographs, and conducting 40 in-depth interviews, race and 
class issues often excluded the non-educated and the non-
white from resources and participation. The group POCupy 
demanded diversification of OWS and argued that “the 99%” 
were not coherent at all in economic terms, as an average white 
US household owned 20 times as much as the average black one 
(Gould-Wartofsky 2015, 98); Occupy Oakland quoted a Jamaican 
activist who criticized the occupiers for not speaking for those 
who needed it most; facilitators or organizers were mostly young 
white people with an education that made it easier for them 
to handle the new modes of communication. Michelle Crentsil, 
member of POCupy, reported, “We could walk through the park 
and yell ‘Mic check!’ And we’re like, ‘People of Color Working 
Group!’ And all of a sudden it gets all muffled and nobody’s 
repeating you anymore. I remember that one. That one really 
hurt” (98). Gould-Wartofksy continues: “Operational funds flowed 
freely to every group but the POC. Many who had come to the 
occupation to speak out found their voices silenced, their views 
sidelined by the facilitators and the drafters of key documents—
often on the pretense that they had not gone through ‘the 
right process’ or spoken to ‘the right people’…. Throughout the 
occupation, I often witnessed white speakers seize the People’s 
15 For an explanation of this special arrangement, see Reynolds 2011.
99Mic from people of color” (99). After philosophical theorizations 
and/or partisan interpretations mainly given by white men who 
never asked themselves about their right or capacity to join the 
protesters, it takes a participatory observer, describing himself 
as an “educated white man in a blazer” (12), to reflect on his 
own point of view and participatory status, including his class/
race/gender situatedness. Those who had better education 
were better able to make use of the elaborate tools of OWS.16 
The human mic, again, is not for all of humanity. The people’s 
mic is not always the people of color’s mic. During the protests 
following Trump’s inauguration, Micah White, so-called co-creator 
of Occupy Wall Street, immediately tried to jump on another 
bandwagon and become the leader of an already existing anti-
Trump movement17—and it was during the Women’s March of 
January 2017 especially where it became obvious that black and 
16 “Everybody should participate, but it tended to be the college-educated and 
the better off who had positions of influence, coordinators, facilitators etc., 
in an unspoken division of labor” (Gould-Wartofksy 2015, 218).
17 White’s book The End of Protest—A New Playbook for Revolution (2016) is 
promoted on Amazon as written by the “co-creator of Occupy Wall Street.” 
Suddenly, White sees the importance of women in OWS, or at least their 
strategic value: “It is significant that the initial spark that brought Occupy 
Wall Street into mainstream consciousness—the pepper-spraying incident 
on September 24, 2011—was an act of violence against women. The video of 
this event, two women screaming in pain surrounded by police, catapulted 
our movement into the spotlight. Looking back, I believe the gender of 
these protesters was crucial in garnering widespread support for Occupy. 
Joining the Occupy movement was also a way of fighting against patriarchal 
authority. Women played a fundamental role in every aspect of Occupy Wall 
Street, especially the facilitation committee that organized the consensus-
based assemblies in Zuccotti, and women will make the next great social 
movement, too.” Like in the magazine Adbuster, these politics are grounded 
in a deeply gender conservative (and antiqueer, antimedia) set of beliefs 
and its old-fashioned calls for a nature of men and women. “I can feel that 
women are on the brink of rising up against a male culture that has been 
fatally poisoned by pornography and video games.” So, White calls for “a 
World Party that embodies our ancient uprising for people’s democracy with 
a maternal twist” (White 2017).
100 white protesters would not only be treated differently, but would 
also not always be aware of internal racism.18 
P/occupy	Milieus
If there are no mediations in Nancy’s thinking of the many, and 
if his figure of the singular seems to always stand in the same 
position towards the many, which cannot hold true for different 
(gendered, racialized…) singulars, how, then, can we make use of 
Nancy’s reflections on, and the practical mediated handling (his 
intricate writing) of, the problem of posteriority, which is always 
associated with superiority and part of causal logistics? Inter-
ventions do need mi-lieus, we see now, not simply because a sabot 
needs physical space to block machines or because the spatial 
metaphors transport ideas of re-sistance more easily. Inter-
ventions need mi-lieus insofar as re-thinking any space has to take 
into account how to connect in an unhierarchical manner, how 
this would be barred through supposedly antecedent structures, 
18 “On Saturday, millions of women and men—organized largely by young 
women of color—staged the largest one-day demonstration in political 
history, a show of international solidarity that let the world know that 
women will be heading up the opposition to Donald Trump and the white 
patriarchal order he represents” (Traister 2017). Other writers included a 
critique of white protesters ignoring the racialized vote distribution (43% of 
white women voted for Clinton, 53% for Trump), different police behavior 
towards protesters, and the outcomes of Trump’s victory (Elliott 2017); even 
the march’s symbol, the pussy hats, were criticized because they “excluded 
trans women, as well as women of color. The pussy hats imply that you must 
have specific genitalia to identify as a woman. Additionally, they excluded 
women of color by insinuating that pussies must be pink. I guess this is why, 
for the most part, the only women you saw wearing the pink pussy hats 
were white” ( Jones 2017). Nancy wrote about the “we”: “We do not have to 
identify ourselves as ‘we’, as a ‘we.’ Rather, we have to disidentify ourselves 
from every sort of ‘we’ that would be the subject of its own representation, 
and we have to do this insofar as ‘we’ co-appear. Anterior to all thought—
and, in fact, the very condition of thinking—the ‘thought’ of ‘us’ is not a 
representational thought (not an idea, or notion, or concept). It is, instead, 
a praxis and an ethos: the staging of co-appearance, the staging which is co-
appearing” ([1995] 2000, 71).
101and how to approach the task of de-learning to put oneself first in 
the line of perceiving and reasoning.
Philosophies of difference cannot do without taking into consid-
eration asymmetrical architectures surrounding their differences. 
Interventions need mi-lieus to move beyond the two sides of a 
lieu.
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Digital Resistance  
in Digital Cultures
An Interview with Steve Kurtz 
by Martina Leeker
Steve Kurtz discusses a variety of forms of 
resistance to global capitalism, and examines 
their possibilities and shortcomings. Included 
are thoughts on occupation and street actions, 
digital interventions, and contestational 
biology.
Martina Leeker: Would you say that Critical Art Ensemble (CAE) is 
one of the “fathers” of interventions in digital cultures?
Steve Kurtz: CAE has been called that, and on one occasion, one 
of the “grandfathers” of interventionism in digital culture 
(and analog, too). I suppose there is some truth in this 
genealogy, but I don’t know if that is the most productive 
way to look at it. CAE was just positioned well historically. 
We emerged at a time when three important shifts were 
occurring, and we were standing in the location where they 
106 all intersected. First, the political emphasis of the cultural 
avant-garde had all but collapsed. Metaphorically speaking, 
the new contract (that began forming in the late 60s and was 
mostly completed by the 70s) was that the financial classes 
would have complete control of this economy, and in return 
would allow complete free expression to artists to explore 
as they pleased—but political action was to be left out. 
Artists could make symphonies of noise, disrupt painterly 
convention, deconstruct theatrical narrative, or assault any 
other aesthetic convention of their choosing. By the early 
90s, this contract was complete, and a clear split was evident 
in which those who refused to surrender their politics went 
in a new direction, ceased to care deeply about aesthetic 
convention, and focused instead on a cultural means of 
political disruption. This type of activity shared cultural 
DNA with the counterculture activist movement known as 
the Yippies (Youth International Party, formed in 1967),1 the 
Haight-Ashbury-based guerrilla theater group the Diggers 
(1966), and the Situationists (1957)—and in a slightly more 
contemporary sense, the anonymous feminist collective the 
Guerrilla Girls (1985), the AIDS activist art collective Gran 
Fury (1988), and the AIDS activist video collective Testing 
the Limits (1987)—none of which were considered artists 
at the time by the cultural establishment. But there was a 
difference in the 1990s from what came previously, and that 
difference was due to the two other simultaneous shifts.
 The second shift was the interdisciplinary turn. In the early 
90s, students like myself who had reaped the benefits of the 
education struggles of the late 60s and early 70s were now 
coming into institutional positions. The borders between 
specializations were becoming increasingly fuzzy. Art as a 
specialization was no longer the only model for production, 
although it was still the dominant one. The borders could be 
1 For all following groups or events the date of formation is mentioned.
107pushed almost anywhere. At this time a new paradigm of art 
making was born, but for it not to be destroyed by the elder 
paradigm a third shift had to occur, and that was the mass 
deployment of digital software and hardware on a consumer 
level, as the graphical user interface (GUI), combined with 
the launch of the World Wide Web. This gave the followers of 
this new paradigm not only a medium to work with, but more 
importantly, a way for the like-minded to find each other on 
an international basis. With that ability, a critical mass could 
be established that made possible a politicized movement 
counter to the avant-garde. CAE was lucky enough to ride all 
these waves.
ML: What are interventions to you and what are they for? 
SK: An intervention is a minoritarian action (usually tactical) that 
interrupts, redirects, or perhaps even transforms flows 
within a given territory. For CAE, interventions are deployed 
as a means to resist the many authoritarian tendencies of 
global capitalism. 
 Art critic, cultural theorist and activist Brian Holmes offers 
a very practical understanding of potential goals for cul-
tural activists through a reading of Félix Guattari. The first 
goal is to create existential territories. To create spaces 
where a different type of affect is possible. Rather than 
the fear and anxiety produced by capitalism, these spaces 
lend themselves to joy, empathy, delirium, and solidarity. 
The international Reclaim the Streets movement (begun in 
London in 1991) is a good example. A second goal is reached 
when a territory and the relations and behaviors within it are 
reframed, reinterpreted, or problematized. A pedagogical or 
consciousness-raising characteristic is a part of this type of 
action. This type of work was common among those in the 
feminist art movement in the US in the 1970s. A third pos-
sibility is the design, engineering, and deployment of tools 
useful for resistance. Most of the time this is done by making 
108 already existing tools do what they were not designed to 
do by re-engineering them to function in service of resist-
ance—like Graham Harwood’s social telephony operations 
(Harwood, Wright, and Yokokoji 2010). However, there 
are those who make their tools from the ground up. Tad 
Hirsch is an excellent example with his pre–Twitter protest 
organization tool, TXTmob (2004).2 The recoding, subversion, 
or destabilization of signs and symbols is a fourth option. 
Most artists and designers seem to have a gift for this. CAE 
has worked in all of these areas in an attempt to reduce the 
intensity of the authoritarian tendencies of capital, and to 
establish an alternative biopolitics (Critical Art Ensemble 
2002). 
ML: Is intervening a ritual?
SK: I would argue that the heart of a ritual, whatever it may be, 
is to establish continuity, an immortality of sorts. We may 
be gone, but the ritual continues. In this manner, we link to 
past and future generations, thus establishing ourselves as 
part of the continuity of life and culture. However, rituals in 
this sense are also delusional. The maintenance of precise 
repetitions in evolving societies is not possible. Take the 
family Christmas ritual in cultures so inclined: a precise 
set of activities cannot be maintained. New people come 
into the system and others depart, changing the balance 
of needs and desires and the manner in which they are 
expressed. Fashions of all types change, so no matter how 
much sameness and family continuity is desired, the ritual 
continues to mutate as the years go by. Another possibility 
is to leave the rituals with professionalized classes (usually 
2 TXTmob, an open-source precursor to Twitter, was developed by Tad Hirsch 
and the Institute for Applied Autonomy. The aim was to enable group cell 
phone text messaging among activists at the 2004 Democratic National 
Convention (DNC) in Boston and the Republican National Convention (RNC) 
in New York City. Thousands of people used it to share real-time information 
about protests and coordinate actions. 
109belonging to religious organizations). These institutions do 
provide more stability, but nonetheless eventually fail. Even 
the Latin mass has evolved. This is why conservatives and 
preservationists get so upset when a ritual changes in any 
way, no matter how perverse the ritual has become. The 
sense of continuity is lost. People can no longer take comfort 
in imagining that a person a thousand years ago was saying 
the same words and making the same gestures as a person 
performing the ritual today or a thousand years from now. 
 Interventionism does not care for continuity from the outset. 
That is precisely what it hopes to disrupt. So in a general 
sense, intervening is not a ritual. In a specific sense, we might 
tactically choose a ritual as a theatrical tool to produce an 
intervention, but it would be the end of the ritual within that 
context. We would have no need to perform it a second time. 
If the intervention were successful, there would be no need 
to repeat it, and if there were failure the ritual would have 
to be transformed into a new functionality or rejected as a 
mistake. 
ML: What is the relation between interventions and 
transformations/re-organizations?
SK: Transformations are the best or worst outcomes of an inter-
vention, or more likely, an aggregate of interventions. On a 
smaller scale, it can be a change in consciousness in terms of 
understanding or perception, or, on a larger scale, a change 
in policy, or a new form of social organization. Of course, 
interventions can go horribly wrong, as they are by necessity 
often grounded in speculation. Situations can turn from a 
threat of violence to actual violence, and control can trans-
form into discipline. 
ML: What is the difference between intervention, resistance, and 
critique?
110 SK: Resistance is the general category for any material or 
immaterial, active or passive manifestation that con-
flicts in some manner with the demands of the powers of 
domination. Interventions are a subcategory of resistance. 
Critique is a systematic analysis of an object or system that 
can be used to inform strategies or tactics of resistance.
ML: Do we need to think about or speculate on alternative forms 
of living, or about organizing society within interventions, or 
as interventions?
SK: Yes, as cultural activists, I believe that speculating on and 
experimenting with alternative forms of living are among the 
activities that we are called upon to do. If we could ever get 
this right, we would no longer need interventions. Organizing 
social formations as an intervention is among the exper-
iments currently underway. The Occupy movement is an 
excellent example. Its very existence was an intervention in 
the social order, and became a public display of people trying 
to develop a new biopolitics—a new way of being together 
and sustaining one another in a peaceful, egalitarian manner. 
Occupy made a very compelling attempt to organize around 
the indefinite as a means to get to the emergent. The con-
figuration had no leaders, demands, or goals—everything 
was left to an indefinite future. As this fuzzy network con-
tinued to exist, only that which emerged from this unscripted 
entanglement was accepted as meaningful (and perhaps 
only in that moment). Through the use of one of the oldest 
strategies of resistance, occupation, participants dumped the 
language of resistance of the past and let a potential “new” 
take form. Of course this action was incomprehensible to 
even the old authorities on resistance, and so there was no 
way it could be allowed to continue. Interesting questions in 
the wake of Occupy are: Should these experiments be done 
in public? And if done in secret, can the outcome be trusted? 
111 And, of course, we need to keep transformational pres-
sure on institutions that have an impact on how we live as 
well. While visiting here at DCRL, I was fortunate enough 
to work with Johannes Paul Raether.3 He has taken up a 
narrative that seemed to have stopped progressing in the 
early 80s (to a large degree because of the AIDS crisis), and 
that is revolutionizing the family away from its cookie-cutter 
heteronormalized form. Throughout the 70s and into the 
80s, radicals believed that the gay liberation movement could 
act as a vanguard toward a new way of conceptualizing and 
configuring the family (and for that matter, sexuality). When 
the AIDS crisis struck, and LGBTQIQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender, Queer, Intersex, and Questioning)4 people were 
suffering on a daily basis because of the consequences of not 
being permitted to participate in family relations recognized 
by law, the political agenda changed. It moved toward 
marriage equality and assimilation. For the radicals this was 
not OK, but assimilation is what happened. Johannes is back 
struggling against assimilation and is asking for radical new 
forms, and is doing so through those formations suggested 
by reproductive technology, but with the difference that he 
horizontalizes the usual hierarchy of mothers. I find it quite 
inspiring that through the queering process Johannes has 
managed to turn a very dark technology into one of utopian 
possibility. The more of this work that is done, the better.
ML: What is the difference between CAE’s Molecular Invasion 
(2002–04) [fig. 1, 2]—a biochemical targeting of a recombinant 
gene in order to destroy the plant—and plant conservation 
as in CAE’s New Alliances (2011–12) [fig. 3, 4], planting an 
endangered flower that has legal protection under the law in 
3 For his projects with queering avatars, see http://www.johannespaul-
raether.net/. 
4 An umbrella term used for anyone whose sexual identity, gender identity, 
and/or gender expression is not considered “standard.”
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[Fig. 1] Critical Art Ensemble and Claire Pentecost, Molecular Invasion, 2002–04. 
Installation view at the Hemicycle Gallery, Corcoran Gallery of Art, Washington, DC 
(Source: critical-art.net). 
[Fig. 2] Critical Art Ensemble and Claire Pentecost, Molecular Invasion, 2002–04. 
Dying Roundup Ready plants (Source: critical-art.net).
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[Fig. 4] Critical Art Ensemble in collaboration with Parco Arte Vivente and workshop 
participants, New Alliances, 2011–12. Completed transplantation (Source: critical-art.
net).
[Fig. 3] Critical Art Ensemble in collaboration with Parco Arte Vivente and workshop 
participants, New Alliances, 2011–12. Transplanting the endangered species Cupid’s 
Dart in a contested public space (Source: critical-art.net).
114 common urban spaces in order to prevent unwanted devel-
opment in those spaces? 
SK: For CAE, initiatives like these are all a part of developing 
contestational biology. We are trying to perform resist-
ance through the frame of science and ecological studies 
as opposed to the frames given by cultural practices, 
humanities, and social sciences. The two projects that you 
are contrasting show the wide spectrum of possibilities of 
how science can be used. As we know, science is neither 
value-free nor politically neutral; we are calling attention to 
this position by making this fact very visible.
ML: CAE does a lot of work with biotechnology. Do you consider 
these projects to be digital interventions?
SK: Yes, on two levels. The simple and literal one is that key 
pieces of hardware and software are digital. Without such 
advancements, molecular biology would be at a near stand-
still. The more important level is that genetics, molecular 
biology, and synthetic biology developed along a parallel 
course with computer science and engineering. This parallel 
development is due to a shared set of analytic metaphors.
 One fundamental scientific principle of the cosmos is that 
order comes from chaos, which comes from order. Digital 
engineering challenged the universality of this contention 
by showing that order comes from order (replication). Even 
science has had to contend with the advancement of the 
digital paradigm on a cosmological level. True, the elder 
sciences of physics and chemistry have held tenaciously 
to their analogic version of the cosmos, but the youthful 
discipline of biology, in a sublime moment of Oedipal rev-
olution, has rejected the analogic model of its elders as 
being useless to its pursuits. Central to this discussion is 
the discovery of DNA. By the 1940s, it was already known 
that heredity is controlled by genes; that genes are located 
on chromosomes found in cell nuclei; and that genes are 
115produced by DNA. However, DNA was not really under-
stood in terms of its full function and potential. It was not 
until Crick and Watson were able to imagine the structure 
of DNA that its true potential was realized. According to 
human genome scientist Maynard Olson, Crick and Watson’s 
discovery was meaningful because it occurred within the 
atmosphere of a formalized digital paradigm. They intuitively 
understood that DNA was not analogic (order from chaos), 
but instead digital (order from order). This type of mod-
eling made possible the biological understanding of the 
production of life. Information replication in the body is 
analogous to digital copying on a computer. Information is 
stored as DNA (in a base-4 format, rather than in a base-2 
format as used by computers), and replicates itself when 
cells divide. Now that this piece of information is understood, 
humans can intervene in the once autonomous molecular 
systems of reproduction. This organic frontier now has 
no borders because the basics of DNA become intelligible 
when one analyzes them using the digital model of infor-
mation storage, recognition, retrieval, and replication. 
Digital humans, animals, food, and medicine are now in the 
marketplace.
ML: How do you see the relationship between information and 
communication technology (ICT) and biotechnology?
SK: ICT has been a revolution of scale. This technology has 
exploded over the past three decades, and has made things 
possible that were only vague possibilities to those in power 
only a half century ago, including the total surveillance state, 
posthuman financial exchanges (like high-speed trading), 
and a true global economy. While international trade may 
have existed for centuries, the national economies were 
fairly separate. Now, a problem in one trading partner’s 
economy is a problem for all partners. The interdependence 
is quite profound. Another way I could put it is that Paul 
Virilio’s global accident is now possible. In the West, the roots 
116 of the globalization project go back to the Roman Empire, 
so in terms of globalization and its spectacle, it is really 
more of the same, only now on a heretofore unimaginable 
scale and with a digital paradigm. As we have discussed, I 
believe biotech to be a part of this same paradigm, but it 
is truly new and revolutionary. ICT has been enveloping us 
for many decades in the West, and its goal has primarily 
been to inscribe bodies with capitalist imperatives and to 
maintain order through mediation. CAE always thought that 
while we cannot escape the spectacle, our bodies, con-
sciousness, and the organic inner world could maintain a 
semi-autonomous position. Now there is nowhere capital 
cannot reach. We are witnessing the beginning of a massive 
redesign of the organic order—to one that better suits the 
needs of capitalism—whether of its creatures (for functional 
or decorative purpose), or its plants and crops, or, to a 
growing extent, the human body. With new reproductive 
technologies, the potential for a new, voluntary form of 
eugenics becomes possible. This would not consist simply of 
selection for health or physical “normality,” but of potential 
predispositions that would make a person more competitive 
and compliant in the marketplace. In this postnatural world, 
the exterior forces of the social and economic spheres can 
link to predispositions programmed into humans. Tempera-
ment can be managed, and desire directed.
ML: Do you see digital models coming to dominate politics as 
well?
SK: That is a very difficult question to sort through at this point 
in history. My belief is that in the West, the tendency is 
toward the digital, especially in the US. I say this not because 
the US is so forward thinking, but because the way that its 
political system is designed transforms so much of pol-
itics into marketing. Marketing and mass communications 
are dominated by the digital. Throw in click-politics, and it 
becomes hard to deny the power of the digital in the political 
117sphere. However, turmoil over recent elections in the 
Western world may indicate that embodied politics may not 
be a total anachronism in digital cultures.
 That said, we have to be careful not to stay in our digital 
bubble. We see the result of doing so from media theorists 
and tech developers quite frequently. They can forget 
that most of the world does not have relationships with 
Facebook, apps, surveillance, or ubiquitous computing, and 
that forgetfulness leads to ridiculous assertions like “The 
Egyptian revolution was a digital revolution.” Such nonsense. 
Sure, there may have been some young people with digital 
skills who were using digital platforms to get their mes-
sage out, but I do not believe that was representative of the 
overall event. I wasn’t there, so I can’t speak from experience, 
but we can look at the basic statistics. The poverty rate in 
Egypt is over 50% and extreme poverty is 28%. Then there is 
another substantial sector of the population (unfortunately, 
it is hard to find a reliable statistic) that is getting by day to 
day, but that is it. This is not a situation for robust sales and 
deployment of digital media. Not to mention that the literacy 
rate is extremely low (26% are completely illiterate). Digital 
communication is by no means the dominant form there. The 
narrative of the Egyptian revolution as a digital revolution 
is a publicity stunt that is a white-washing of corporations 
like Google, Facebook, and Twitter as progressive, and as 
delivering revolutionary products that change the world in 
a utopian manner. Yet we now know with certainty after the 
Manning and Snowden revelations how much the digital 
revolution has contributed to current global dystopian 
tendencies. 
ML: Has the utopian moment passed for digital cultures and if 
yes, what does this mean for interventions in these cultures?
SK: Oh yes, if there ever was one to begin with. Perhaps the 
moment was there when the culture was limited to scientists 
118 exchanging data over the Internet, but as soon as it became 
a technical system assimilated into capitalist political 
economy, the party was over. For example, one of the most 
common promises that accompanies any new technology 
is that it will reduce labor time, with the implication that 
there will be more leisure time. Of course, the opposite 
happens, whether the new technology is a steam engine 
or a computer. Production rates are increased and labor is 
intensified. With digital technology and its propensity for 
miniaturization, workers were struck twice in that they were 
either given or had to buy their own (!) tools of labor (cell 
phone and laptop) that transformed them into permanent 
work platforms. Digital workers are always on call and 
ready to work. And if that weren’t enough, these same tools 
evolved into the means for governments and businesses to 
keep individuals under surveillance at all times. 
 I know there are those individuals who claim surveillance is 
fine; privacy is dead—all well and good. If corporations are 
storing, analyzing, buying, and selling our metadata, it is 
only so they can better understand our needs and desires so 
they might serve us better. And if the government is storing 
and analyzing our metadata, it ’s only because they need it to 
keep the nation secure and orderly. Of course, these ideas 
are all nonsense. Governments are using this technology to 
expand their disciplinary apparatus to be used in a manner 
beyond that of neutralizing criminality, while corporations 
are looking for a way to construct in us a desire for their 
goods and services. Surveillance makes such goals possible, 
and the deeper they get into our lives, the more we become 
managed and controlled. And let’s not forget what a profit-
able commodity information is. 
 The truly aggravating part of all this is that it didn’t have 
to be this way. We could live in a metadata-free society. 
The knowledge about how to do it is there, but it won’t be 
done because liberty like that is completely unacceptable to 
119capitalism. Even the universities are complicit. Having spent 
35 years of my life as an educator, I watched critical thinking 
be slowly exorcized from the university and replaced with 
neoliberal business strategies, and nowhere has that had 
a worse impact than in science, technology, engineering, 
and math (STEM). The culture of STEM is a problem-solving 
one. The unfortunate part of this method is that it is con-
tained within a bubble of wealth, in conjunction with a very 
specialized point of view. In practice, this manifests as total 
focus on the problem and its solution, with no thought 
about the consequence of any solution once it is out in the 
world and subject to corporate and state policy. Most of the 
dystopic consequences of digital technology are tragedies 
in engineering. I realize that powerful outside forces are 
in play—but still, there are elements within STEM that 
technocrats do control, and therefore should do something 
about, like introducing more critical thinking, ethics, and 
sociological and historical analysis. 
 So yes, the utopian moment is gone. It can still exist for 
individuals, but a systemic change would require a recon-
struction of the digital infrastructure, or at the very least a 
radical revision of software. Choices have been made (and 
not democratically), a lot of bad engineering has happened, 
and we are too far down the road to start over.
ML: What is CAE working on next?
SK: Necropolitics and ecological struggle, but that is a topic for 
another interview.
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Mobile Devices of  
Resistance:	Victorian	
Inventors, Women Cyclists, 
and Convertible Cycle Wear 
Kat Jungnickel
While	middle-	and	upper-class	Victorians	were	
quick to embrace the bicycle, cycling proved 
materially and ideologically challenging for 
women. Conventional women’s fashions were 
vastly inappropriate for cycling: materials 
caught	in	wheels	and	tangled	in	pedals.	Yet,	
looking too much like a cyclist in some con-
texts challenged established gender norms 
about how and in what ways women should 
move in and through public, to the point where 
cycling	women	suffered	verbal	and	sometimes	
even physical abuse. This essay explores how 
some	Victorians	responded	to	challenges	to	
women’s freedom of movement by patenting 
“convertible” cycle wear. These material inter-
ventions enabled women to resist social and 
physical limitations on their mobile bodies 
and identities. Drawing on feminist science 
and technology studies, archival research, and 
patents, this essay critically explores these 
unique garments as heterogeneous human and 
non-human	devices	and	discusses	how	they	
operated	as	creative	socio-technical	mobile	
devices of resistance. 
The craze for bicycling has made a complete 
revolution in the needs of dress, and there 
are almost as many inventions for this special 
amusement as days in the year. Every week at 
least a patent is either taken out or applied for 
touching on bicycle clothes. Happily there is a 
variety of opinion as to the requirements of this 
particular amusement.  
The Queen: The Lady’s Newspaper, 1895
This essay explores the socio-technical conditions for inter-
vention from a historical perspective. My research is located 
in Victorian Britain from 1890 to1899, which was a decade of 
radical social, technical, and cultural change. The Victorians are 
renowned for engineering and patenting, a combination of which 
boomed in the mid-1890s in response to the cycling craze that 
swept the nation. The nineteenth century brought with it mass 
industrialization, a plethora of new inventions, and opportunities 
to travel and see new worlds, which catalyzed radical ideas about 
what it meant to be a modern citizen. Amongst other things, 
125out of this century came the bicycle, sewing machine, and new 
mass media. This essay is part of a larger project about how the 
Victorians responded to social, political, and technical restrictions 
on mobile women’s bodies in public spaces. Here I discuss 
patented cycle wear as a creative socio-technical mobile device of 
resistance. 
It may seem strange to readers to focus on a case study set a 
century before the advent of digital cultures recognizable in con-
temporary life. The feminist archival turn in the social sciences 
has opened up different ways to engage with the past in order to 
understand the present. Cultural studies scholar Kate Eichhorn 
explains how this move “has made it commonplace to under-
stand the archive as something that is by no means bound by 
its traditional definition as a repository for documents” (2013, 2). 
Archives are a place to start, not finish, and irrespective of the 
time between viewer and viewed, these repositories speak to the 
present as much as the past. I aim to argue that there is much to 
learn from historic accounts of interventions, not only because 
past socio-technical conditions are in many ways not so different 
to our own, but also because they operate as useful reminders of 
the value of identifying and studying small, seemingly marginal, 
examples. 
I approach the study of interventions via science and technology 
studies (STS). In particular I draw on actor–network theory, 
more commonly known as ANT, which provides a useful lens for 
thinking about interventions in the context of socio-technical 
networks. ANT emerged from early science studies in recognition 
of the role played by non-humans as well as humans in com-
plex socio-technical heterogeneous networks (Law and Hassard 
1999; Latour 2005). Many, including its inventors, have critiqued 
network theory over the years, with feminist STS scholars in 
particular questioning the stabilization of networks (Star 1991, 
1995, 1999; Wajcman 2014). Susan Leigh Star (1991), for instance, 
focuses specifically on interruptions in seemingly fixed and 
smooth systems and processes. Her famous essay on “being 
126 allergic to onions” explores experiences that do not fit collective 
understandings of the world. She writes about how asking for “no 
onions” radically interrupted McDonald’s standardized processes, 
resulting in a 45-minute delay to her “fast food.” Simple issues 
like this cast heterogeneous systems in fresh light. The non-
onion eating “deviant” body intervenes in the system. In doing 
so, it renders visible larger socio-technical systems in place, 
often hidden behind the scenes, that produce the standardized 
burger and with it the idea of a universalized consumer. These 
kinds of norms, Star argues, collectively “insist on annihilating 
our personal experience” (1991, 48). Her work reminds us that 
experiences, bodies, and relations to technology are much richer, 
more complex, and messier than this. Interventions help us see 
and know things differently.
Gaining these kinds of unique insights into socio-technical 
systems and practices, however, is not easy. Sometimes, as 
indicated with Star’s example, it requires something to break or 
rupture in order to glimpse “the forgotten, the background, the 
frozen in place” (Star 1991, 379). They can also seem uninteresting 
at first. Star (1995; 1999) has done much to advocate the study 
of seemingly “boring” things, by pointing out that it is rarely the 
thing itself that is boring, but how we tend to approach it. In fact, 
STS scholars have argued that the more mundane and trivialized 
something is, the more important its role probably is in daily 
life. Star provides an illustrative example of how to approach the 
study of infrastructures, which is an often overlooked and under-
valued subject of study:
The ecology of the distributed high-tech workplace, home, 
or school is profoundly impacted by the relatively unstudied 
infrastructure that permeates all its functions. Study a city 
and neglect its sewers and power supplies (as many have) 
and you miss essential aspects of distributional justice and 
planning power …. Study an information system and neglect 
its standards, wires and settings and you miss equally 
essential aspects of aesthetics, justice, and change. Perhaps 
127if we stopped thinking of computers as information highways 
and began to think of them more modestly as symbolic 
sewers, this realm would open up a bit. (1999, 379)
This kind of scholarship provides ways for researchers to enter 
the “black box” of socio-technical systems and practices. Black 
boxes are ideas, systems or things that appear firm and fixed 
after they have been in place for a while. They become familiar 
and invisible; we tend to forget how they came about, what 
choices were made, and which materials and processes were 
accepted or rejected. Finding new ways into the black box is to 
ask critical questions about their cultural, gendered, historical 
and material composition. As Star writes: “When standards 
change, it is easier to see the invisible work and the invisible 
memberships that have anchored them in place” (1991, 44). 
The crucial point here is that it is not only the technology that 
becomes black boxed, but also the larger heterogeneous net-
works of humans and non-humans that produce and reproduce it 
on a daily basis. In questioning these seemingly stable and fixed 
socio-technical systems and artefacts we get to ask why we “get 
the technologies we deserve” and how and in what ways they 
“mirror our societies” (Bijker and Law 1992, 3). 
Clothing is a particularly interesting subject for the study of 
intervention. Changes in clothing portend changes in society. 
Identifying, focusing and understanding these changes can reveal 
much about socio-political shifts. Yet it is often overlooked and 
undervalued in critical study. Barbara Burman (1999), a textile his-
torian, has written extensively about the “culture of sewing” and 
gender politics of clothing in nineteenth and twentieth century 
British history. Despite the richness of this topic for under-
standing social shifts and gender relations she explains how 
many scholars “have regarded clothing as peripheral to historical 
enquiry, as too ephemeral or too everyday to warrant attention” 
(1999, 3). From an STS perspective, this makes clothing a primary 
area for understanding socio-technical relations. 
128 My empirical focus in this chapter is on inventive forms of 
cycle wear, which emerged as a result of intersections of new 
technologies (bicycle, sewing machine, and mass media), social 
conditions (restrictions on women’s freedom of movement), and 
political contexts (patenting reform, dress reform movement, 
and women’s rights movement). How did women respond to the 
challenging social circumstances and physical issues presented 
by cycling? What did they invent? How can these inventions be 
seen as creative socio-technical mobile devices of resistance? 
Interventions in Gender Relations and  
Public Space
The bicycle took Victorian society by storm in the 1890s. Although 
it had been around in various forms throughout the nineteenth 
century, it was the Safety Bicycle, with its two matching wheels, 
rear-drive pedaling system, lower price and easier handling that 
broadened its appeal and reach. While middle- and upper-class 
Victorians embraced this new form of mobility with enthusiasm, 
some found it easier than others. Cycling proved to be physically, 
materially, and ideologically challenging to women ( Jungnickel 
2015). Established Victorian social norms and behaviors for how 
middle- and upper-class women should move and act in public 
shaped how, and in many cases even if at all, they should ride a 
bicycle. Higher-class women were not expected to move much. 
At the time “leisured, or idle, wives and daughters had become 
expensive status symbols for successful middle-class men” 
(Holcombe 1973, 1). Conventional fashion, with floor-length skirts, 
up to seven pounds of layered petticoats, restrictive corsets, 
and tailored blouses and jackets, made it physically difficult if 
not impossible to undertake mundane domestic activities or 
leisure pursuits. The extent of a woman’s immobility reflected 
the capacity she had for those around her, such as a household 
of servants, to be mobile. Writing about the social role of fashion, 
sociologist Diane Crane argues: “The ideal role of the upper-class 
129woman, who was not expected to work either inside or outside 
the home, was reflected in the ornamental and impractical nature 
of fashionable clothing styles” (2000, 16). 
The popularity of cycling in the late nineteenth century 
exacerbated problems with women’s conventional fashion 
for those wishing to engage in more active lifestyles. As con-
temporary cyclists know, the many moving mechanisms of the 
bicycle do not fit well with layers of loose flapping materials. 
Despite this, many persisted with this unruly combination and 
newspapers reported on the sometimes terrible consequences.
Sir—I see in your columns a doubt expressed as to cycle 
accidents due to dress. We have had a terrible one in these 
parts, which can clearly be traced to the skirt. I allude to 
the death of Miss Carr, near Colwith Force. The evidence of 
her friend who rode just behind her, says that “Miss Carr 
began the descent with her feet in the rests, but finding the 
hill become much steeper, she strove to regain her pedals 
and failed.” I think she failed because she could not see the 
pedals, as the flapping skirt hid them from her view, and 
she had to fumble for them. Could she have taken but a 
momentary glance at their position, she would have had a 
good chance to save her life. The poor girl lingered a week. 
(The Buckman Papers 1897, Daily Press, September 20)
Although it had been around for a while, the dress reform 
movement had a resurgence in the late nineteenth century. 
Members campaigned on multiple platforms but broadly advo-
cated more rational dress over irrational fashion. However, 
wearing more suitable cycle wear, such as rational dress in the 
form of bloomers or knickerbockers, short or no skirt, and looser 
or no corset did not result in a seamless social experience. These 
highly visual “New Women,” who moved independently, often 
without a chaperone, at speed, in new places and times such as 
the evening, unsettled some parts of society. Their masculin-
ized dress and behaviors were seen to “ape the lifestyles and 
130 perceived privileges of manhood” (Simpson 2010, 55) and many 
felt society’s wrath in different ways; some were denied entry 
to inns, catcalled in public spaces, and in some cases suffered 
physical violence. Writing in 1899, Irene Marshall’s experience 
illustrates how difficult it must have been for a woman to claim a 
cycling identity at this time.
But it took some courage five years ago to ride in rationals. 
The idea was almost entirely new and the British Public was 
dead against it. Hooting and screeching were then the usual 
accompaniments to every ride. Caps, stones, road refuse—
anything was then flung at the hapless woman who dared 
to reveal the secret that she had two legs. And the insults 
were not confined to the lower classes. Well-dressed people, 
people who would be classed as ladies and gentlemen, 
frequently stopped and made rude remarks. In fact, cycling 
in rationals in 1894 was a very painful experience. (Marshall 
1899, 40)
To cycle as a woman was an intervention in established middle- 
and upper-class behaviors in Victorian society. To wear radical 
new forms of cycle wear was yet another intervention in how a 
woman should move in and through public space. Neither were 
initially comfortable or safe positions to inhabit. While many 
women persisted, bravely putting their radically clothed mobile 
bodies in public spaces, some intervened in socio-political 
and technological contexts in more subtle ways through their 
clothing. By imagining, designing, and patenting new forms of 
cycle wear, such as convertible cycle wear, inventors set out to 
equip women with the devices to limit the possibility of harass-
ment while, at the same time, resist these limitations and attempt 
to re-configure the parameters of conventional feminine modes 
of behavior and movement in public spaces. 
131Interventions in Cycle Wear 
Patents and patenting are useful sources of data for social 
science research. American historian of technology Ruth 
Schwartz-Cowan defines a patent as “a temporary monopoly on 
the economic benefit that can be derived from an invention. As 
such a patent turns an idea into a form of property; the person 
who has a new idea, a patent asserts, can own it in the same way 
that he or she may own land or money” (1997, 120). Inventors tell 
us about themselves, their identified problem, solution, and who 
in many cases they were designing for. Patents also provide a 
particularly good record of women’s inventions, at a time when 
women are largely absent from other primary records. 
A boom in patenting in the mid-1890s has been attributed to 
cycling’s popularity. The late nineteenth century was a period 
of significant legal reform in Victorian Britain. The early 1880s 
Patent Reform Act greatly reduced fees and streamlined what 
had previously been a more complicated and time-consuming 
process. This opened patenting up to a wider range of new and 
smaller inventors. The Married Women’s Property Act also came 
into force around this time, and allowed married women to have 
more control over their own property. A decade later, the cycling 
craze that swept the country provided further motivation for 
individuals to seek to claim their ideas and forge new paths into 
social, cultural and economic domains. Amongst patents for 
velocipedes and their many accoutrements were some from a 
group of Victorian inventors attempting to respond to the “dress 
problem”—how to enable women to safely and comfortably cycle 
while not looking too much like a cyclist. To do this, inventors 
intervened in what clothing could do. Many attempted to design 
this dual role into skirts:
My invention relates to the improvements in ladies’ skirts 
which will render them equally adapted for cyclists, tourists 
and ordinary wear; and has for its object to provide a skirt 
that will have all the comfort and convenience of a divided 
132 skirt with a smooth seat for the saddle, and yet in walking, 
will be indistinguishable from an ordinary skirt. (Sellick 1897, 
emphasis mine)
This invention relates to improvements in cycling skirts and 
has for its object to construct these in such a manner as to 
allow the rider the full use of her limbs without any of the leg 
exposed and at the same time to have the appearance of an 
ordinary walking skirt when the rider is not on her machine. 
(Sibald 1897, emphasis mine)
This invention relates to improvements in connection with 
ladies’ skirts and has for its object to provide an arrangement 
which can be easily altered from an ordinary skirt into a 
divided skirt and vice versa. (White 1897, emphasis mine)
The broad aim was to give women choice to perform multiple 
identities. While there were many strategies at work, I focus on 
a unique subset of patented cycle wear—convertible costumes. 
These garments enabled the wearer to convert their clothing 
when required, from middle- and upper-class urban walker or 
shopper to cyclist and back again. An illustrative example of 
these patented designs is by Alice-Louisa Bygrave, a dressmaker 
from Brixton in London. Her patent for “Improvements in Ladies’ 
Cycling Skirts” was accepted on December 6, 1895. It features a 
skirt with a built-in pulley system at the front and back. Weights 
stitched into the hem ensured a quick change when needed. 
Bygrave explains her unique design: 
My invention relates to improvements in ladies’ cycling 
skirts and the object is to provide a skirt as proper for wear 
when either on or off the machine … I fasten a tape or cord 
to the bottom edge of the skirt in front and carry this cord 
up through suitable guides to the top of the skirt where it is 
made fast in any convenient way … As the wearer prepares 
to mount her machine, she pulls both cords in from the top, 
thereby raising the skirt before and behind to a sufficient 
height. (Bygrave 1895) [Fig. 1]
133What is particularly relevant to discussions about socio-technical 
interventions is the location of these convertible devices in the 
garment. They were hidden inside skirts: in the seams, behind 
the waistbands, stitched into the hems, and hidden in gathered 
fabric. Concealment was central to the design. The nature of the 
garment would reveal itself only if and when the wearer desired 
it. What this also means is that the convertibility of these cos-
tumes was difficult to discern from the outside, on the surface. As 
evident in the larger research project in which examples of these 
costumes were made and worn, many of these designs only make 
sense on and with the body ( Jungnickel 2017). This is one reason 
why no surviving artifacts from this period have been found (as 
yet) in British museums or galleries. These women did their jobs 
so well in deliberately concealing the nature of these garments 
that it makes it hard, if not impossible, to see and know the value 
of these designs if you are not specifically looking for them. 
[Fig. 1] Illustrations of Alice-Louisa Bygrave’s patented cycling skirt (Source: Bygrave 
1895).
134 Inventors like Alice-Louisa Bygrave recognized the desire of some 
women to claim multiple identities. They sought to intervene in 
the mobile landscape by providing wearers with choice and con-
trol. Wearers could safely and comfortably cycle if they wished. 
They could also choose to avoid unwelcome social abuse by not 
looking like a cyclist. These garments equipped women to resist 
dominant normative codes of behavior, at different times, and 
for specific purposes. Convertible cycle wear made possible other 
ways women could inhabit public space and negotiate relation-
ships with new technologies and society. 
Learnings from Historic Interventions
Why are historic accounts of interventions useful to con-
temporary researchers? Even though located over a century ago, 
these examples remind us that the past is not so far removed 
from the present. As Eichhorn argues, the archive should be 
viewed “not as a place to recover the past but rather a way 
to engage with some of the legacies, epistemes, and trauma 
pressing down on the present” (2013, 5). The history of radical 
new forms of mobility clothing shows us that interventions do not 
have to be loud, heroic, or even easy to see to produce valuable 
social insights. The case of convertible cycle wear is an extreme 
version of this. Designs were deliberately hidden, inside the 
seams and hems of skirts—often indiscernible to non-wearers. 
Yet, they intervened in the gendered normative mobile subject, 
making possible different means for women to negotiate mobile 
identities in public space at a time when this was physically 
and ideologically problematic. The importance of attending to 
marginalized or fringe behavior is also present in this essay. STS 
and clothing scholars argue that understanding social change 
comes not from a study of standardized normative behavior but 
rather from attending in detail to the marginalized, deviants, 
and rule-breakers. As Crane writes: “Had a nineteenth-century 
social scientist set out to predict how women would dress at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, it would only have 
135been by considering the clothing of the most marginal women 
in Europe and America that an accurate assessment would have 
been obtained” (2000, 99). Designing and wearing convertible 
cycle wear was not a dominant form of inventive activity, yet it is 
revealing for how individuals were using patents to collectively 
explore and materialize forms of resistance. 
This research comes from the “Transmissions and Entan-
glements: Making, Curating and Representing Knowledge” 
project supported by an Economic and Social Research Council 
Knowledge Exchange grant with support from Intel Corporation 
(ES/K008048/1).
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Engaging in Methods 
This volume is an experiment in fostering thinking in ambiva-
lences, which is potentially a way of dealing with the problem-
atic constitution and situation of interventions, the facilitation 
of which is attempted through organization of the texts. Some 
essays in the book analyze the constitution of interventions, 
concerning either gender, history, or policy, and use the insights 
gained to propose various methods. Other texts focus on 
practices and methods of intervention in the conditions of digital 
cultures without specifically reflecting on the constitution of 
intervention itself. This combination of approaches brings about 
a reflection on interventions in accordance with the two aims 
of the book. The first aim is to examine the shaping of digital 
cultures by interventions, and vice versa, and the second con-
cerns the reconciliation of the constitution of interventions in 
political, economic, or discursive conditions. To achieve a mutual 
reflection, the texts are collected under a list of methods and 
140 have been carefully balanced to enable readers’ self-organized 
reflection on interventions.
A short reconstruction of the order and interplay of the texts, 
focusing on critical and reflected methods that come out of the 
analytical approach to interventions, should provide an insight 
into the power of following, and thinking in, interventions’ 
ambivalences. 
Reading the Chapters 
Fred Turner proposes historicizing as a method for exploring the 
aesthetics and dramaturgies of interventions in today’s digital 
cultures. In his interview, Fred Turner talks about the multi-
screen environments that were used in the 1940s/1950s and the 
1960s as an aesthetic means to develop what he calls the “dem-
ocratic surround.” The aim of the surround was the creation and 
control of self-determined, democratic individuals by training 
them to form their own worldview by piecing together frag-
ments. But even as the artists involved were trying to achieve 
an emancipative social arrangement, they became part of a 
Cold War policy of forced democratization and, furthermore, 
engaged themselves in attempts to control the effect of this 
process. This context is to be taken on board as a prehistory of 
today’s digital cultures as well as interventions into them. In this 
framework, a historical approach clarifies the instrumentalization 
of interventions, or of art as intervention, in order to under-
stand which methods, concepts, and dramaturgies we should 
avoid repeating. The aim is securing interventions against a 
repetition of this history. Instead of intervening in digital cultures 
by immersion in multisensory environments as affective and 
cognitive apparatuses and happenings of unconscious Be-In, Fred 
Turner votes for the establishing of distances and differences. 
An example is the photographic work of Wayne Lawrence (2013) 
at Orchard Beach, the Bronx Riviera, which presents people at 
respectful close-range. It is about standing still, according to Fred 
141Turner, about looking and reflecting, instead of—in accordance 
with the analysis of this problematic status of interventions—
acting and performing. This is one possible method against the 
big techno-ecological players today, involving people immersively 
in socio-technological systems. 
Howard Caygill also follows a historical reconstruction of inter-
ventions in digital cultures and at the same time stands for 
research into its ambivalent political constitution. He refers to 
Clausewitz’s notion of resistance in the sense of the capacity 
to survive violent attacks (Widerstandsfähigkeit), using, for 
example, secrecy as a strategy. The prehistory of interventions 
in Clausewitz’s concepts of secrecy and resistance shows that 
as a form of resistance in digital cultures, interventions can 
apply equally to war as to subversion, freedom, and equality. 
This strategic constitution also conditioned the configuration 
of the Internet by Paul Baran within the RAND Corporation in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, creating an Internet that is able 
to survive attacks by being decentralized and, at the same time, 
creating secrecy by using cryptography. A genealogical point 
of view excavates the paradoxical constitution of the Internet, 
determining today’s resistance to and interventions in it. The 
appropriate method for interventions is thinking in ambivalences. 
Fighting against the state’s monopolizing of information 
technologies also means fighting against decentralization. Inter-
vening in digital cultures has to be sensitive to the paradoxical 
situation, grounding itself firstly in decentralized structures in 
order to not leave traces. It could, secondly, use encryption, 
knowing that this calls the state’s resistance investigating in 
strategical cryptography. Interventions in digital cultures ask 
for continuous reflecting, keeping the military and war con-
texts of resistance in mind and pondering the interplay of the 
opponents, each envisaging its own survival. Howard Caygill’s 
contribution provides training to think about the ambivalences of 
interventions.
142 Alexander R. Galloway also opts for intervention in infra-
structures. He claims the invention and realization of other infra-
structures in the manner of other, so-called ad hoc networking, 
which could, in reference to Howard Caygill, enable invisible 
interventions in moments of revolution. Instead of interrupting 
infrastructures and software in interventions as hackers did in 
the 1960s, Alexander R. Galloway argues that today, we need 
robustly running alternatives. 
Making differences and enabling discomfort are the methods 
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun proposes for interventions in digital 
cultures, especially in their infrastructures as networks and 
databases, working against homophily and habits that constitute 
them. Habits build infrastructures and survive even technological 
or social changes. Homophily, a concept from 1950s’ sociology 
meaning love of the same, generates heavy segregation as a 
basic constitution of, for example, social networks. Against this 
background, Wendy Hui Kyong Chun calls for the establishment 
of critical digital humanities that become indispensable in digital 
cultures, in which Big Data analysis or user profiling are done by 
ideologically based, recursive algorithms. Overcoming the prej-
udices concerning gender, race, and class, as well as habits that 
all together constitute data processing, requires the invention of 
other infrastructures as interventions in digital cultures, and for 
that, transdisciplinary cooperation is necessary. 
Ulrike Bergermann also votes for the power of differences and 
differentiation as a basis for interventions in digital cultures. In 
her example, she explores the human microphone as a medium 
of protest, which she studies in terms of a critical politicizing of 
space. The affordance of this analog medium in interventions in 
digital cultures is not to speak for the other. A gendered being-
with should help to overcome prejudices and pre-inscriptions in 
collective protest, which can exclude those who should have a 
voice in protesting. For interventions in digital cultures, questions 
of the politics of space, leading to those of gender and race, need 
to be clearly in focus. Both Ulrike Bergermann and Wendy Hui 
143Kyong Chun highlight that it is not technology itself that can bring 
critical points to digital cultures, but the concepts they are based 
on. 
Steve Kurtz also stresses the importance of differences as a basis 
for continuous interventionist work. He gives an overview of the 
intervention methods and projects of the Critical Art Ensemble 
(CAE), which has been active since 1987. They carry out inter-
ventions into destructive ecological situations, biotechnology, 
and digital technology. In every field, the intervention methods 
are interrupting and queering in order to make people think 
differently, and speculating to find alternative ways. These 
methods overcome the problematic hype about pure perfor-
mativity, also mentioned in Fred Turner’s insight into the history 
of interventions, and transform interventions into a work of con-
tinuous queering as an institution of critically dealing with digital 
cultures. 
Kat Jungnickel confirms the importance of continuity for 
effective and non-violent interventions with an example from 
the nineteenth century. She discusses a subversive strategy that 
enabled women to ride bikes in the strict and normative Victorian 
age. A skirt with a concealed option to transform into a trouser-
like garment, freeing women to be mobile; challenging violence 
with viscosity, which resulted in sustainable changes. Referring to 
Howard Caygill’s analysis of the ambivalences of resistance, the 
women performed a calm, continuous, intelligent and sustainable 
revolution that could be taken as a model of interventions in 
digital cultures. 
Outlook:	Differences,	Discomfort,	
Sustainability
The interplay of contributions to this volume reveals a common 
call for interventions capable of introducing differences 
144 concerning racial, gender, or political inscriptions on the level of 
technology, concepts, habits, and thinking (see McPherson 2012). 
It has also yielded a second result that is just as important. 
Instead of following the hype about never-ending performative 
intervening, it is an affirmation of calm and sustainable inter-
ventions (see Kat Jungnickel), and the building of alternative and 
sustainable infrastructures (Alexander R. Galloway) that will be 
effective and productive. Now, just when digital cultures have 
become part of everyday life, interventions seem less invested in 
interruption, which used to be the primary aesthetic, and more 
invested in construction and building. At the same time, as it 
becomes obvious in Steve Kurtz’s interview, there is still a need 
for pranks, subversion, stumbling blocks, and thus methods, 
aesthetics and dramaturgies for enabling a permanent and sus-
tainable indicating of problems and strengthening of attention 
and perception, as well as rethinking in order to follow critical and 
problematic progressions in the current and future development 
of digital cultures.
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